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ABSTRACT 
Operational risk management is one of the broadest functions of any financial 
institution and one of the hardest to control. It is also a rather new risk category; 
companies around the world are paying more and more attention to operational risks. 
Financial institutions and researchers have realized that it is essential to try to identify 
all risks, not only market, credit and strategic, but also operational risks.  
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the existence of operational risks in Finnish 
insurance companies, especially Company X, and clarify the key operational risks. In 
terms of operational risk and operational risk management Finnish insurance companies 
are on the borders of transition. It is important to analyze the current stage of 
operational risk management so that further development could take place in the future. 
 
The data in this qualitative research has been collected from interviews with operational 
risk managers working at insurance companies in Finland and from the employees of 
Company X. Operational risk managers from Finnish insurance companies offer a broad 
and professional perspective to the questions while employees from Company X bring a 
more detailed and pragmatic approach to the answers. Interviewees responded to a 
questionnaire that was sent to them before face-to-face interviews. 
 
The results show that Finnish insurance companies are very aware of operational risks, 
but the tools used are still relatively simple. Systems-related risks, human risks, 
technological development and regulations are the four main operational risks that 
Finnish insurance companies face today. There is one clear similarity between the tools 
and methods used by insurance companies in Finland and it is also the tool used to 
prioritize resources for operational risk management. The results provide evidence that 
operational risk management in Finnish insurance companies needs further and more 
specific research so that companies could improve their own operational risk 
management. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Operational risk, insurance company, regulations, system 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Operational risk management is one of the broadest functions of any financial 
institution and one of the hardest to control. Operational risks are also very hard to 
categorize. If we go back to the 1980s operational risk management did not even exist, 
but in the past two decades knowledge of operational risk has grown rapidly. 
Esterhuysen, Vuure and Styger (2010) say that operational risk is not a new concept for 
banks although the collection and evaluation of data for operational risk only dates back 
two to three years (six to seven years from 2014). Financial institutions and researchers 
have realized that it is very important to try to identify all risks, not only market, credit 
and strategic but also operational risks. After identifying all the risks managers must 
decide how to use limited resources to prioritize and manage these risks. Studies have 
also shown how challenging it is to collect data for operational risk management since 
there is only limited data available; this in turn highlights the importance of the correct 
interpretation of the data.  
 
Operational risks manifest themselves in numerous ways, for example: internal or 
external fraud, rogue trading, terrorism, environmental hazards, systems breakdown or 
even sabotage. Operational risks also include human risk, legal risk, information risk 
and reputational risk. All these operational risks need to be managed in different ways. 
Controlling or predicting these kinds of risks is obviously quite challenging. It is also 
difficult to agree on an exact definition of operational risk because its broadness. Basel 
2 defined operational risk as follows: “the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people or systems or from external events”. 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2001). This definition includes legal risk but 
excludes strategic and reputational risk. Companies have generally accepted this 
definition as the standard. 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the existence of operational risks in insurance 
companies (Company X) and clarify what those risks are. Although managing 
operational risks is similar across the whole in the financial sector, little attention has 
been paid to the retail banking and investment banking areas. The target is also to assist 
insurance companies to recognize their key operational risks in Finland. Finally it is 
intended to create a theoretical framework that can be used to support (Company X’s) 
internal/external operational risk management.  
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1.1 Research question 
 
This research is focused on operational risk within Finnish insurance companies, 
especially the Company X. The main point of the study is to identify the key operational 
risks, particularly those that have the largest impact on Company X’s everyday 
processes. Once the key operational risks are identified, the main focus is to offer 
solutions using some of the most common tools for operational risk management. These 
tools can be found in operational risk management work in Finnish insurance 
companies and research on operational risk management. The research questions are: 
 
- What are the key operational risks in the Finnish insurance company (Company X)? 
- What are the most common tools used in operational risk management? 
- How to prioritize and allocate resources between different operational risks? 
 
When the key operational risk and the tools have been found it is important to know 
where and how to prioritize and allocate the limited resources of the company. 
 
1.2 Structure of the study 
 
The structure of the study is quite simple. After the introduction I will start by opening 
up the meaning of basic business risks, in particular credit, market, strategic, and finally 
operational risk. I will use both previous research on the topic and relatively new 
publications. This second chapter of my study should inform the reader of the basics of 
business risk management in the financial sector.  I will also give some practical 
examples of operational risk and the most up to date methods to measure it. Although 
this study focuses on operational risk in the insurance business, I have included a lot of 
information from Basel 2 regulations for operational risk.  This is because banks and 
insurance companies have a rather similar perspective on operational risk management. 
 
In the third chapter the focus is on operational risk. This chapter will provide a more 
advanced view of operational risks and operational risk management. 
 
In the fourth chapter I will concentrate on the operational risk management in insurance 
companies. Firstly, I will provide a more global view of operational risk management in 
insurance companies then move on to a more domestic perspective as some risks, such 
as environmental and legal, are different in Finland than in the rest of the world. It is 
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necessary to identify regional differences and similarities but, of course, these 
boundaries are shrinking all the time thanks to the European Union and rapidly 
advancing globalization. This section will also be based on previous literature and 
research, however, following the comparison of global and domestic viewpoints, I will 
start the research part of this study. 
 
In my research I will identify the key operational risks in the Finnish insurance 
company/ Company X. Here the reader should understand the separation between key 
operational risks and less significant operational risks. It is also important to find out 
which are the most common tools used in operational risk management and how to 
resources allocated to operational risk management are prioritized between different 
operational risks. At this point I will carry out qualitative research into operational risks 
using a questionnaire and existing publications. 
 
Finally, I will create a helpful, indicative guide for Company X’s operational risk 
management based on the results of the investigation carried out in the study and then 
reveal my conclusions. 
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2. BUSINESS RISKS 
 
2.1 Overview on the basics of business risks 
 
Nowadays there is a seemingly infinite number of risks that surround the business world 
and companies operating in it. Risk Management has become a vitally important factor 
as a result of globalization and the continuing demand for greater returns. (Clarke & 
Varma, 1999) It is very important to know how to prioritize your limited resources and 
allocate them to the right risks in order to maximize the benefits of risk management. 
When this is done well it provides savings to the company and thereby an advantage 
over its competitors. 
 
Competition in financial markets has grown rapidly in just a few decades, therefore the 
management of a company has become more intensive and detailed. This development 
has led to companies having multiple management fields, including risk management. 
Increasing amounts of resources are being invested in this field. Risk management itself 
can be divided further into sub-sectors, the number of which varies between companies. 
The Basel committee of banking supervision has divided risks into three main sub-
sectors: credit risk, market risk and operational risk. However, in this chapter there is 
one more sector in addition to those mentioned above: strategic risk.   I will go through 
the following risk categories: 
 
- Credit risk 
- Market risk 
- Strategic Risk 
- Operational risk 
 
Too often management focuses their concentration only on the negative consequences 
of the risk. (Clarke & Varma, 1999) 
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Figure 1. RISK (Clarke & Varma, 1999) 
 
 
2.1.1 Credit Risk & Market Risk 
 
Traditionally credit risk has been part of an interaction between two individual 
operators. When the loan was made to the borrower the credit risk remained on the 
lender’s balance sheet until the debt was repaid or written off. In all simplicity the credit 
risk is the risk that borrower cannot repay the debt. However, nowadays credit risk is 
much more complex than before. The loan can be packaged and traded and then 
repackaged again. A short time ago banks and insurance companies were the only 
parties to offer loans. Today rating agencies, financial guarantors, and a variety of 
special-purpose companies, all serve as critical links in the credit chain. (Cacouette, 
Altman & Narayanan, 1998) 
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Duffie and Singleton state, “Credit risk is the risk of default or reductions in market 
value caused by changes in the credit quality of issuers or counterparties”. This means 
that today, financial markets are full of financial components under the responsibility of 
many participants in the market. Lopez and Saidenberg have a similar way of defining 
credit risk: “Credit risk is defined as the degree of value fluctuations in debt instruments 
and derivatives due to changes in the underlying credit quality of borrowers and 
counterparties.” Bonds, swaps, derivatives and other financial instruments all have more 
than one responsibility carrier due to the very complex structure of the financial 
markets. (Duffie & Singleton, 2003).  
 
Past economic theory tells us that credit and market risk are tightly related. Not only do 
they have strong relationship, but they are also “not separable”. This means that if one 
changes unexpectedly the other changes too. When the probability of default 
unexpectedly changes, it generates credit risk and this affects the market value of the 
company generating market risk. Because these risks are related to each other similar 
components affect them both. Economic fluctuations have an indirect impact on credit 
risk but a direct impact on market risk, in fact, market risk is shaped by the uncertainty 
of the markets. As the name suggests, market risk results from the overall performance 
of the financial markets, it is also called systematic risk or “un-diversifiable risk” 
because it is impossible to reduce through diversification. For these reasons, it is very 
difficult to try to avoid market risk. (Jarrow & Turnbull, 2000). 
 
Raghavan defines market risk as the possibility of loss to a firm caused by changes in 
the market variables, that is the risk that movements in equity and interest rate markets, 
currency exchange rates and commodity prices will affect the value of a firm. Under 
market risk there are more specific sub-scenes. First is liquidity risk. Liquidity is the 
ability to turn your assets into a more “mobilized” form, for example cash is very liquid 
but a company’s know-how is far from liquid. Usually the more liquid the assets are, 
the lower the profit. Cash in your pocket does not increase wealth. The opposite can 
also be true when there is a lack of liquidity to take advantage of profitable business 
opportunities. Balancing opportunities and increasing capital adequacy is hard work 
especially for banks and insurance companies 
 
Interest rate risk is one part of market risk. Interest rate risk is the potential negative 
impact of the movement in interest rates. Changes in interest rates affect earnings, the 
value of assets and cash flow. Additionally there is currency risk and foreign exchange 
risk, both resulting from negative exchange rate movements. Lastly, under the market 
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risk, is country risk. As you can imagine there are many risks present in cross border 
transactions. There is the possibility that a country will be unable to repay debts to 
foreign lenders on time, political risk when government is taking over the assets of the 
financial entity (like nationalization) and of course huge cultural differences between 
countries can pose a risk in a specific course of action. (Raghavan, 2003) 
 
2.1.2 Managing Credit and Market Risks 
 
Now when we have basic idea of what these risks are, it is natural to move to 
management of these risks. Risk management is vital for all participants in the financial 
sector and the survival of a firm depends heavily on its capability to prepare for change 
in the future rather than just react when change is already happening. Risk management 
is not expected to prevent the risks facing a company, but to ensure that the company is 
familiar with the risks they are taking. Through comprehensive knowledge of  risks it is 
much easier for a company to measure the risks and prepare protection plans. However 
these risk protection actions cost money and balancing between risk and return is not an 
easy task. (Raghavan, 2003) So the question remains: “Which risk protection actions  
should we focus on and which not”.  
 
Although the economics of risk management for financial companies is far from an 
exact science, it can, to a certain degree, be managed. (Duffie & Singleton, 2003) The 
basic idea of managing credit and market risk is try to protect the company from a loss. 
This loss protection applies to almost every risk category. When dealing with credit and 
market risk, companies have to protect themselves by managing expected loss. 
Expected loss is part of probability theory and the attribute expected always refers to the 
future. Companies have to try to “guess” their future losses, so they can prepare. These 
“guesses” are made with complex financial models. Credit and market risk 
measurement models generate forecasts of losses based on different variables. These 
measurements clearly have the potential to improve risk management efficiency. When 
the forecasted loss measurements have been carried out properly, management has a 
much easier job to decide how best to manage the risks.  (Lopez & Saidenberg, 2000) 
 
2.1.3 Strategic Risk 
 
Strategic risk differs slightly from credit and market risk. When risk management works 
with strategic risk the question posed is, “Is there a need for change?” The world is 
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constantly changing and those organizations that can follow the change are in a strong 
position. In contrast, those organizations that cannot adapt to changes effectively 
enough are likely to perish. Strategic risk management makes an evaluation of the 
market conditions today and then makes a forecast of potential changes that will occur 
over a period of time. (Roberts, Wallace &McClure, 2003) Risk management can ask, 
“Which way is the market going in the future?”  Of course, this is a question that 
everybody wants to know the answer to.  However, for example, a decade ago post 
office strategic risk management might have asked, “Should we focus on traditional 
mailing or should we focus on mailing via the Internet?”  Today it is easy to answer to 
that question but a decade ago it was not possible to know. These kinds of strategic 
decisions are vital to an organization’s future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
Figure 2. Strategic risk management 
 
 
Strategic risk management and corporate governance often go hand in hand. Indeed, 
corporate governance is about making strategic decisions. Stephen A. Drev, Patricia C. 
Kelley & Terry Kendrick have divided strategic risks into five elements: Culture, 
Leadership, Alignment, System, and Structure (CLASS). Each of these five elements 
relates to the others. Organizational culture consists of leadership practices, systems 
support organizational structure and have an effect on its culture. No element stands 
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alone. Boards have to know that making changes in one element has an effect on the 
others. Poor strategic risk management can quickly remove competitive advantage. 
 
  
Table 1. Risks 
 
 Definition Caused by Managing 
Credit risk -Credit risk is the risk of 
default or reductions in 
market value 
-Changes in the credit 
quality of issuers or 
counterparties 
-Having full knowledge 
of the risks that the firm 
is taking 
Market risk -The possibility of loss 
to a firm caused by the 
changes in the market 
variables 
-Movements in equity 
and interest rate markets, 
currency exchange rates 
and commodity prices 
will affect the value of a 
firm 
-Having full knowledge 
of the risks that the firm 
is taking 
Strategic risk -Risk resulting from an 
incorrect forecast of 
future market trends 
when developing initial 
strategy 
- Senior level 
misjudgments and 
mismanagement of risk 
 
-Having full knowledge 
of the risks that the firm 
is taking 
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2.2 Operational Risk 
 
Not all risks faced by financial institutes are in the readily categorized and modeled 
categories above. For example the risks of internal fraud or system breakdown do not 
bend easily to modeling. These kinds of risks are usually categorized in a section called 
operational risk. (Lopez, 2002) In the past decade, operational risk has risen from non-
recognition to become a crucial factor for corporate risk management units and has 
played a significant role in a number of corporate collapses. No wonder it has risen so 
quickly straight to the core of risk management. Operational risk has generated a 
sizeable quantity of research and investigation in the past years. (Moosa, 2007) This 
chapter will open up the topic of operational risk. 
 
2.2.1 What is Operational Risk 
 
Operational risk has gained increasing visibility and notoriety due to past events. The 
media and regulators alongside business executives and corporate collapses caused by 
failed operational risk controls have contributed to a growing focus on operational risk. 
(Moosa, 2007)  Although the risks of fraud, natural disaster or reputational damage have 
existed for centuries, the potential of operational risk made a breakthrough only 
recently. (Buchelt & Unteregger, 2004) Reasons for this breakthrough can be explained 
by technological development, increasing competition and globalization. Technological 
dependence, for instance, exposes a firm to system failure and therefore management 
has to pay closer and more serious attention to operational risk. 
 
Regulators such as Basel 2 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and 
Solvency 2 have defined operational risk as follow: “the risk arising from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people or systems or from external events”. (Basel committee 
on banking supervision, 2001) and “the risk of loss arising from inadequate or failed 
internal processes, personnel or systems, or from external events”. (Solvency 2, 
Directive 2009/138/EC). These definitions are important when building regulations for 
financial institutions. Regulations set out the operational risks that a financial institution 
has to manage. Regulations are made to protect investors, clients and corporations 
themselves and also exist to make sure that everybody in the industry is playing by the 
same rules. Despite this, there are multiple arguments against regulations. Danielsson et 
al. 2004 uncovered some shocking side effects of setting value-at-risk constraints in an 
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economy. They say, “The effect of such constraints is to induce behavior that 
exacerbates the shocks further.” Also Kaufman and Scott (2000) concluded that many 
bank regulatory actions have been double-edged, if not counterproductive. 
 
The definition published by Basel 2 is actually partly from the definition of Robert 
Morris Associates et al. (1999). He defined operational risk as “the direct or indirect 
loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or from 
external events”. The Basel Committee dropped the indirect loss from the definition. In 
this definition reputational risk is surprisingly ignored given that reputational risk and 
reputational damage are very powerful factors. Although the Basel 2 definition for 
operational risk is said to be “official”, it has not been accepted without discussion. 
Turing (2003) claims that the definition of Basel 2 is “so broad as to be totally 
unhelpful”. Herring (2002) criticizes the definition direct from the first version where 
the Basel Committee started using a definition for operational risk which included all 
risk that is neither credit risk nor market risk. When the Basel 2 definition was narrowed 
to its final version, basic business risk was completely omitted. Herring’s opinion was 
that final definition is too narrow. Hadjiemmanuil (2003) claimed that the Committee’s 
definition for operational risk is “deeply flawed and it is not based on some generally 
accepted understanding of operational risk”. 
 
However Basel 2 was not the only party to define operational risk. Vinella & Jin (2005) 
defined it as, “the risk that the operation will fail on or more operational performance 
targets, where the operation can be people, technology, processes, information and the 
infrastructure supporting business activities”. Nevertheless these definitions are just 
words and for risk management it should not make a big difference which words are 
used to define operational risk. 
 
2.2.2 Practical Examples on Operational Risk 
 
In this chapter we move from defining operational risk to practical observations from 
the financial business world. As previously mentioned, there have been corporate 
collapses and bankruptcies caused by realized operational risks. This chapter introduces 
the reader to operational risk types and some major incidents concerning operational 
risks. 
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Alexander Cambell (2012) made a list of the top 10 operational risks for 2013. The list 
includes all kinds of operational risk types from natural disaster to political intervention. 
These operational risks will give the reader a more practical understanding of what is 
meant by operational risk. 
 
Top 10 operational risks for 2013: 
(Alexander Campbell, Operational Risk & Regulation 2012)  
 
Table 2. Top 10 operational risks 2013 
 
Operational Risk Example 
1. It sabotage 
 
- Cyber attacks  
 
2. Reputational damage 
 
- Banks and financial institutes least trusted sector 
of business 
 
3. Incentives and compensations 
 
- ”Mis-sold” products 
 
4. Fraud and customer data abuse 
 
- Economic downturn à Employees might have 
financial pressure à Generate frauds 
 
5. Epidemic disease 
 
- Severe acute respiratory syndrome 2003 (SARS) 
- H1N1 2009-2010 
 
6. Political Intervention 
 
- One of the largest potential sources of operational 
risk 
- Eurozone debt crisis ”far from over” 
 
7. Sanctions and AML compliance 
 
- Banks in the spotlight accused of negligently or 
willfully breaking anti-money laundering (AML) 
rules or international economic sanctions. 
 
8. Emerging markets operating risks 
 
- "Proper securities regulation in today's emerging 
markets is tantamount to "proper" regulation of 
tomorrow's developed markets. Therefore, 
emerging markets within Iosco and the global 
financial system are much more important than 
they were in the past.” 
 
9. Business continuity and disaster recovery - Hurricane Sandy 2012 
 
10. Failure to enforce internal controls 
 
- 2010 UK –bribery act 
- UBS roguetrader Kwelu Adoboli 
 
 
 
All of the risks listed above are quite broad, but when realized can cause major damage. 
In this case Cambell focuses on low frequency high impact operational risk but actually 
discussion in financial studies argues for a financial corporate focus on low frequency 
high impact rather than high frequency low impact risks.  The impact here is on capital 
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adequacy. Alexander Carol (2000) argues that it is more important to focus on low 
frequency high impact risk; regulators in particular should target their regulation on 
high impact risk. He did not completely dismiss high frequency low impact risks 
because of the “tail” loss. Tail loss is the effect after the high frequency low impact risk 
has occurred. The ordinary loss can be relatively small, but tail loss could have 
enormous influence on firms’ abilities to operate. Many high profile losses in the 
financial industry have been traced to operational risk. 
 
In 2008 a Finnish bank, Danske bank (formerly Sampo bank) faced difficulties with 
their new E-banking system. This online banking was aimed at customers and was not 
working properly. Changing the E-banking system contained varying levels of possible 
operational risks. Some of these risks occured and the improvement of the e-banking 
system did go as planned. This problem caused financial losses and a loss of customers. 
Some competitors claims that the loss of customers for Danske was as high as 40 000. 
Of course Danske bank denies this. This realized operational risk caused Danske bank 
customer and financial losses, but more importantly it caused irreparable reputational 
damage. (Taloussanomat, 2008) 
 
A much more dramatic realized operational risk was the Enron scandal in 2001. The 
main feature of this scandal was its speed. Just a few months before bankruptcy, Enron 
Corporations was widely regarded as one of the most innovative, fastest-growing and 
best-managed firms in the United States. With hindsight it is clear that only the better 
side of Enron Corporation was visible to outsiders. The true condition of the firm was 
quite different. Issues in auditing, accounting, corporate governance and elsewhere led 
to the collapse of the Enron. The independent auditor made mistakes accidentally or 
possibly intentionally. In the accounting division the corporation’s financial statements 
were formed in contravention of the rules of the financial statements of special purpose 
entities (SPEs). The company’s board of directors failed in internal monitoring, which 
led to the possibility of internal frauds. These are all major operational risk and they are 
almost completely responsible for the bankruptcy of Enron Corporation. 
 
2.2.3 Measuring Operational Risk 
 
Firms in the financial sector are very good at measuring credit and market risk but 
measuring operational risk is much harder and a relatively new approach because 
operational risk is a rather new risk category and there is no “right” way to measure it. 
	   22	  
Nevertheless, the financial industry wants to learn new quantitative approaches for 
operational risk. It is possible that a full quantitative approach may never be achieved 
but some techniques have already been identified in the theory of operational risk. Some 
stochastic methodology for quantitative analysis of certain types of operational loss data 
has been found. Only “certain types” of data are because not all operational risk data 
bend themselves easily to a full quantitative analysis. Operational risk data is very hard 
to put into a measurable form, for example it is almost impossible to know how much 
reputational damage is created by an individual realized operational risk. On the other 
hand legal risk fits much more comfortably in a quantitative analysis. The purpose of 
this chapter is to present operational risk measurement approaches. (Chavez-Demoulin 
et al. 2006) 
 
Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2006) begin investigation of operational risk measurement 
with a well-known approach for risk measures and the development of advanced rating 
models for credit risk. Former practice to theory can also be expected to work in the 
area of operational risk. Basel 2 has work on the development of the Advanced 
Measurement Approach (AMA). AMA is one of the Basel 2 regulation standards for 
banks on operational risk. “Under the AMA approach, banks will have to integrate 
internal data with relevant external loss data, account for stress scenarios, and include in 
the modeling process factors which reflect the business environment and the internal 
control system.” In 2014 only one bank in Nordic countries uses the AMA approach, 
SEB. 
 
Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2006) based their research on the fact that banks collect data 
under AMA because operational loss events and loss random variables have to be well 
founded. For the calculations extreme value theory (EVT) is used because it is a useful 
tool for analyzing rare events and several operational risk classes possess properties 
which are naturally suitable for an EVT analysis. To aggregate data they use worst-VaR 
(Value-at-Risk) case. This means that data is aggregated with worst scenarios of the 
operational risk. They find that a clean standardized EVT approach is not available but 
generalization is possible and further study is needed. 
 
Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2006) introduces operational risk measurement possibilities 
but finally just offer some new ways to approach operational risk measurements. 
Alexander Carol (2000) has a slightly different approach using Bayesian methods for 
measuring certain operational risk, such as transaction processing risks and human risks. 
The Bayesian methods come from Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs). BBN dates back 
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to the late Reverend Thomas Bayes (1702-1761). In a letter he turned the view of basic 
assumptions in classical statistical models around. The question in classical statistical 
models is “what is the probability of my data, given that there is this true value fixed 
value in the data”. Thomas Bayes’ asked, “What is the probability of this parameter, 
given what I observed in the data”. Every day there is more and more data in the world 
and that is the reason why Bayes’ rule has garnered more attention. The main pillar of 
the Bayesian methods is the theorem of conditional probability of events X and Y. The 
basic equation is formed as follow: 
 
Equation 1 
 
 
Can be re-written according to Bayes’ rule: 
 
Equation 2 
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Figure 3. Bayes rule. Source. Carol (2000) 
 
 
 
A little example will make it more reasonable. Example is about measuring human 
risk, which is one of the most difficult operational risks to measure. 
 
Lets suppose that you have a helpdesk where employers answer to the phone and 
help customers when needed. Because you are the manager of that team you have 
noticed with wide experience that 20 % of the time the team is providing 
unsatisfactory service. And when the team is working well and more efficiently, 
customer complaint data indicates that 70 % of clients would be satisfied. This leads 
to the fact that the probability of losing a client is 30 % when the team is working 
well. With your wide experience you have noticed also that when the team is 
working lazier the probability of losing a client rises as high as 60 %. 
 
Now you have notice that the company has lose a client and you think were the team 
working well or bad. The probability of the helpdesk team providing unsatisfactory 
service is countable with the information above.  
 
 
Where, X = unsatisfactory service 
 Y = event “lose a client” 
 Your prior belief is that prob(X) =0,2 
 
 
 
With Bayes’ rule: 
 
  
 
 
With all this information the former belief that the team is not providing good 
service (20% of the time) is underestimation. Actually help desk team is providing 
inadequate service one third of the time. 
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This simple example of the Bayes’ rule shows that with more study there could be more 
specific calculations for operational risk. For this reason the use of these kinds of causal 
networks to model operational risks has grown rather rapidly. 
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3. OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
Managing risks lies at the heart of financial companies and for this reason more and 
more resources are allocated to risk management operations. Credit and market risk 
have received more attention in the past but now operational risk has been brought into 
consideration when building risk management strategy. Regulators such as Basel 2 for 
banking and Solvency 2 for insurance have been established to focus on operational 
risk. (Chavez-Demoulin, 2006) The largest banks have developed models to improve 
the internal management of operational processes and insurance companies have created 
products for operational risk. Operational risk management will soon join credit and 
market risk as one of the main categories of risk management, if it has not already done 
so. (Carol, 2000) 
 
3.1 Identifying Operational Risk 
 
Which should companies focus on: low frequency high impact risk, or high frequency 
low impact risk? Some claim that, focus on low frequency high impact risk is much 
more important because the realization of high impact operational risk could be fatal if 
the company has not prepared for it. Others claim that high frequency low impact risk, 
when aggregated, could cause major damage to the company. This, however, is just one 
way to approach operational risks. There are numerous ways to identify operational risk 
and the initial perspective shows the direction. In this chapter I will introduce a couple 
of ways in which companies in the financial sector identify their operational risks. 
(Alexander Carol, 2000) 
 
In the past, we have witnessed realized operational risk such as frauds, legal deals going 
wrong, technological failures and smaller errors such as system breaks or failures 
caused by untrained staff. For a company it is important to recognize these kinds of 
operational risk and be prepared if they are realized. Perhaps the most famous case of 
fraud was committed by Bernard Madoff whose ponzi scheme was one of the biggest 
frauds in the history of finance (over 50 billion US dollars). The reason I have brought 
this up is that it affected many financial companies but, with proper operational risk 
management, this fraud could have been avoided or at least noticed earlier. Gregoriou 
and Lhabitant (2009) investigated the Madoff scandal and found there were salient 
operational features common to best-of-breed hedge funds that were clearly missing 
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from Madoff’s operations. This means that with proper quantitative analysis someone 
should have identified the incompleteness of Madoff’s operations. The surveillance 
failed over and over again and Madoff continued making money with the ponzi scheme. 
The main issue was that there was no third party oversight and no third party to 
independently confirm the legal ownership of the fund’s securities. This made 
performance manipulation possible. Furthermore, Madoff used a very small auditor, this 
should obviously have raised doubts. By contrast, Madoff also used large, reputable 
audit firms, which probably reassured investors. 
 
The list of these kinds of “red flags” is long, but still Madoff proceeded for almost two 
decades. If internal and external controls had been effective, this ponzi scheme might 
not have occurred, at least not to such an extent. (Gregoriou and Lhabitant 2009) 
Avoiding internal and external fraud is one of the key functions of operational risk 
management. Madoff created his empire from nothing and maybe internal controls 
failed because Madoff himself was above all investigations. 
 
From the perspective of an operational risk manager, identifying rogue trading from the 
beginning is more important. A rogue trader is a trader who usually trades with high 
risk, high reward investment, but does not have permission to do it. A rogue trader is a 
gambler who plays with money from the institution that employs him. In the biggest 
cases of rogue trading the employer has usually been a big bank.  
 
The world’s most famous rogue trader is Nick Leeson who worked for Britain’s Barings 
Bank at the Singapore office. Leeson invested very large amounts of money in Nikkei 
futures and options, almost 3 billion dollars. These investments were unauthorized and 
Leeson managed the whole investment himself. When the Nikkei experienced a 
downturn Barings bank lost over 1 billion dollars and fell into bankruptcy. One man 
caused the bankruptcy of a more than 200 year old bank which was, at that time, the 
biggest bank in the world. This could have been avoided with better internal control. As 
we now know realized operational risks can cause major damage to a company and 
even bankruptcy. Another rogue trader was caught in 2011, his name is Kweku 
Adoboli. Adoboli made off-the-books trades that at one point were worth more than 7 
billion pounds. Ultimately Adoboli caused over 1.5 billion pounds worth of losses to 
UBS (Union Bank of Switzerland).  
 
UBS has also been a participant in a different kind of realized operational risk. They 
were involved in the manipulation of Libor (London Interbank Offered Rate) rates. 
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UBS, along with five other banks (Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, JPMorgan and 
RBS) have admitted their involvement in the manipulation of LIBOR rates. (Rosa M. 
Abrantes-Metz, Michael Kraten, Albert D. Metz & Gim S. Seow, 2012) 
 
How can financial institutions find these operational risks before it is too late? Knowing 
what will happen in the future is impossible, but preparing for the future is achievable 
and strongly recommended. One way to forecast the future is to look at historical 
evidence. Unfortunately there is not as much historical operational risk data as credit 
and market risk data. Although companies have recently started to collect data such as 
loss events data, it is still far from the historical data that is possessed concerning credit 
market risks. 
 
3.2 Managing Operational Risk 
 
Douglas G. Hoffman sums up operational risk as: “operational risks are those of our 
interconnected world becoming disrupted on a large scale, or locally in our workplaces 
or neighborhoods through acts of man, or of nature.” They can occur through careless 
omission and co-workers’ mistakes, or frauds causing massive damage to our 
companies. According to Hoffman, operational risk usually lies in wait, quietly hidden 
most of the time. Large operational risk occurs far less frequently than small operational 
risk and this makes large operational risks more dangerous. This situation causes 
management to ignore and underestimate large operational risk, creating one of the 
challenges of managing operational risk. Operational risk management should be a 
balance between reasonable control and overbearing control of large-scale operational 
risk. 
 
Dr. Jacques Pezier divides operational risks into three different broad sections: 
Nominal, Ordinary and Exceptional. The nominal operational risk is the risk of repeated 
losses, losses that may occur once a week or more frequently. A practical example 
could be human error in a transaction processing. According to Pezier, these kinds of 
losses hardly deserve to be called risks. He thinks that they should rather be compared 
to the cost of controls. Although the nominal risks are quite small, the losses are very 
expensive. If the company improves procedures and creates a better quality culture, it 
often creates savings immediately and also gains beneficial long term effects on 
reputation and client relationships. Therefore nominal operational risk should be taken 
into consideration when creating operational risk strategy.  
	   29	  
Ordinary operational risks losses occur less frequently but create larger costs, yet are 
not life threatening for financial institutions. They are often the result of several 
independent strategic choices and therefore should be analyzed within the wider context 
of those choices. 
 
The third operational risk that Pezier created is exceptional operational risks. These 
risks rarely occur but may be life threatening to financial institutions. These risks 
deserve special attention.  
 
 
Figure 4. Operational risk loss distribution. Source: Cruz (2002) 
 
 
The diagram above shows the relationship between frequency and losses. As we can 
see, high frequency low impact risks occur more often and those risks are not yet 
dangerous to a company. But still there is the opportunity to create savings when 
managing risks correctly. The higher the loss, the lower the frequency is. This is normal 
when dealing with risk generally. When the line moves towards the right, frequency 
drops and these risks are life threatening to a company.  
 
The probability of exceptional risks occurring is very low but they can be life-
threatening to financial institutions. These risks deserve special attention. Large banks 
and financial institutions carry out scenario analyses to identify exceptional risks. 
Actually the AMA approach is also a tool for scenario analysis. (Chavez-Demoulin et 
al. 2006) Low frequency, high impact operational risk events are of particular interest to 
operational risk managers or at least should be. (Jobst, 2007) 
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Although high impact losses are crucial to companies, it is very important to manage 
high frequency low impact risks also. This is because of the tail events. Tail events are 
typically formed after the occurrence of minor operational risk. The minor risk provides 
the opportunity for other operational risks and when this continues the final impact 
could be at a major loss level. Basel 2 requires banks to target their attention on 
unexpected losses (low frequency high impact) and tail events. Banks have to capture 
tail events before they become excessive. (Esterhuysen et. all. 2010) Nevertheless 
insurance companies have still not received the same kind of regulations from Solvency 
2 and need to wait for the release of regulations in 2015. Although there are no 
comprehensive operational risk regulations for insurance companies, some use Basel 2 
instructions as an indicative guide. Bank regulators (Basel Committee) are and will be 
trailblazers in operational risk management. 
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4. QUALITATIVE METHODS 
 
Because my main study focuses on the interviews I have carried out, it is important to 
become familiar with qualitative methods. Data gathering from interviews is still the 
most common method in qualitative research such as this. In qualitative interviews the 
interviewee is seen as a participant of the study, unlike quantitative interviews where 
the interviewee is seen as a research subject and the relationship between interviewer 
and interviewee should be minimized to avoid the impact of inter-personal processes. A 
qualitative researcher believes that the relationship between interviewer and interviewee 
is important and provides every single interview with unique answers. The interviewee 
should respond to questions actively rather than passively. The relationship between 
interviewee and interviewer is the key feature of the qualitative research. (Cassel & 
Symon, 2004) 
 
4.1 Interviews 
 
Interviews can be done face-to-face, by telephone or even via the Internet. Of course the 
best result usually comes from face-to-face interviews. When interviewing face-to-face 
the relationship between interviewer and interviewee is much more authentic and 
usually gives better quality answers. Selecting interviewees for qualitative research is 
usually nonrandom and a small sample, as in this study. 
 
4.2 Qualitative Research 
 
In qualitative research the researcher has a huge responsibility for how to analyze the 
results from interviews. It is inevitable that the researcher’s own knowledge and 
perspective comes into the picture when analyzing results. This is one of the reasons 
why, throughout history, scholars have argued whether research is and whether it 
creates a credibility problem when an individual analyst interprets results. However 
Madill et al. (2000) conclude that it does not matter as long as the researcher makes 
his/her relationship with the material clear. So the challenge for the qualitative 
researcher is to show that personal interest will not bias the study. (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1998) The researcher could have, for example, a political agenda which might 
reduce the credibility of the study. In this study there is no political agenda or any other 
agenda which could influence the integrity of the study. 
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Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research is not based on calculations or pure 
data like stock values of a particular firm within a particular timeframe. Qualitative 
research does not give measurement and analysis of the causal relationship between 
variables but the processes and socially constructed nature of reality. (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2011) In this chapter the main focus is on what is qualitative research. The war 
between qualitative and quantitative research has been set aside. 
 
With qualitative study the researcher is trying to determine the cause of events and after 
that focus on predicting similar events in the future. Qualitative research is often chosen 
because there is a lack of theory or an existing theory fails to completely explain a 
phenomenon. The researcher gathers data to build hypotheses or theories and rarely 
tests former hypotheses. Understanding observations and interviews is very important 
when trying to build hypotheses. The qualitative researcher uses words and pictures 
rather than numbers when addressing the phenomenon. The data collected is treated 
with equal weight. This means that all pieces of the data have equal value during 
analysis. In this case the major part of the data comes from interviews. (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2011) 
 
This qualitative research aims at identifying key operational risks in a Finnish insurance 
company with help from the interviews. Interviews also assist when investigating the 
most common tools used in operational risk management in the insurance business in 
Finland. Finally, the interviews give perspective on the question of how Finnish 
insurance companies prioritize resources between different operational risks. The data 
collected from the interviews should be enough to create a helpful guide for operational 
risk management. 
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5. OVERVIEW OF THE INSURANCE BUSINESS 
 
The insurance business has been around as long as people have had property or assets to 
protect and can be traced back almost 5000 years. 5000 years ago, Chinese traders 
protected their cargo with primitive diversification when they had to cross a dangerous 
river. A thousand years later, Babylonians created a more modern profit insurance 
business. The lender offered insurance against robbery to a borrower in exchange for 
higher interest rates. The first insurance companies were formed after the great fire of 
London in 1666. The past of the insurance business has created the foundations of 
today’s insurance companies and their operating practices. This chapter describes the 
basics of the insurance business today in general, in Finland and in Company X. 
(RandMark40) 
 
5.1 Insurance Business 
 
A human has always wanted to cover its back. This is one reason why the insurance 
business is a tremendously large financial sector. Everybody wants to be prepared for 
when something goes wrong. Harris Schlesinger from the University of Alabama wrote 
an article on The Theory of Insurance Demand (2013). Insurance demand is said to be 
“the purest example of economic behavior under uncertainty”. Uncertainty is very 
important feature of the economic world today. The world is living in a constant cloud 
of uncertainty but if this uncertainty grows too quickly and too much, it may trigger an 
economic downturn. Insurance companies benefit from balanced uncertainty, but like 
other financial sectors, the insurance sector too suffers in an economic downturn. For 
the insurance sector a downturn means an increase in payments of compensation and a 
decrease in new business. 
 
The theory of insurance demand does not deal with the trading risk, but with a personal 
risk. Personal risk originates from the consumer’s individual life.  The consumer could 
try to find other similar consumers, who could share the same type of personal risk. 
They could try to pool risks with a large group of consumers, but it would be difficult. 
Insurance companies organize these pools for consumers so it is only needed to join the 
pool rather than create one. (Harris Schlesinger 2013) 
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Insurance can be considered as a financial asset. Unlike most financial assets, insurance 
is a contract contingent on the individual’s own personal financial circumstances and is 
therefore non tradable. Although insurance can be considered as a financial asset this 
personal nature of the contract separates it from other financial assets. The basic idea of 
insurance is very simple, although the contract could be rather complicated. For 
example, the consumer pays a fixed premium and, in return, the insurer will pay the 
insured a sum of money dependent on the value of a loss that the consumer has 
suffered. (Harris Schlesinger 2013) 
 
Moving on from the insurance business, it is time to focus on the business sector itself. 
The world’s three largest life insurance companies 2015 in terms of total assets are 
AXA from France (US $1.022 bn), Allianz from Germany (US $0.98 bn) and MetLife 
United States (US $0.902. The number one life insurance company from the USA is 
MetLife (ranked fourth in the world with US $0.837 bn).  Company X total assets are 
worth US $0.108 bn. MetLife is almost eight times bigger that Company X. (The 
Statistic Portal, 2014) 
 
“The insurance business is nowadays a combination of information and technology, 
both of which are critical cornerstones for successful operation.” (Järvinen Raija, 
Lehtinen Uolevi and Vuorinen Ismo, 1998.) 
 
5.2 Insurance Business in Finland 
 
The basics of the insurance business in Finland are the same as everywhere else 
although in the Nordic countries social security has been organized according to the 
Nordic welfare state model. This model guarantees basic living security, rights to public 
services and income security. The minimum security is financed by tax assets and 
aimed at those who cannot obtain enough income otherwise. From a global point of 
view, the minimum security level is slightly better in Finland than the Western 
European average. The Finnish government takes care of the minimum security and 
statutory health insurance. Car insurance and work injury insurance have been 
organized by private insurance companies. The majority of the population working in 
the private sector has statutory pension insurance from private pension insurance 
companies such as Ilmarinen Mutual Pension Insurance Company. (Sosiaali- ja 
Terveysministeriö, 2015) 
 
	   35	  
The primary part of social security is the occupational pension. This covers invalidity, 
retirement and a spouse or parent’s death. National pensions and guarantee pensions are 
financed completely by taxes, these guarantee pensions secure a minimum income if the 
occupational pension is too small or not accumulated at all. The guarantee pension is 
paid to people whose total pension is less than the full guaranteed pension. The full 
guaranteed pension in 2015 is 746,57 euros per month. All people living permanently in 
Finland are insured against sickness. Employers, employees and the state finance health 
insurance together. In Finland, all employees are also insured against unemployment. 
The state, employers and employees fund unemployment insurance. (Sosiaali- ja 
Terveysministeriö, 2015) 
 
There are approximately three different types of private insurance companies in 
Finland, mutual pension insurance companies, health insurance companies and damage 
insurance companies. In 2013 the balance sheet value of all Finnish insurance 
companies was 114.5 billion euros, of which 70% was mutual pension insurance 
companies’ share. The total gross premium was 22 billion euros, where mutual pension 
insurance companies’ share was 12 billion euros. (Tilastokeskus, 2013) 
 
5.3 Company X 
 
Company X is a financial security company from the USA that provides insurance, 
wealth management, investment and financial solutions. This holding company has over 
15 million customers in more than 25 different countries and over 600 institutional 
partners. It all started in 1871 as The Life Insurance Company of Virginia. In 1986 it 
was sold to Combined Insurance, later known as Aon. Almost a decade later in 1996, 
Life of Virginia was sold to GE Capital and 8 years after that GE Capital formed 
Company X from the various insurance businesses of General Electric. This was the 
USA’s largest IPO of 2004. Company X is a Fortune 500 company and in 2013 it had a 
turnover of 9.4 billion US dollars, with an operating profit of 560 million dollars.  In the 
whole corporation there are almost 6000 employees. Standard & Poor’s has given 
Lifestyle Protection credit rating “A”. 
 
Lifestyle Protection markets a range of life insurance, long-term care insurance and 
fixed annuities. The company offers universal life insurance products which provide 
permanent protection for the life of the insured. Protection from illness, accident, 
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involuntary unemployment, disability and death are the primary insurance products of 
Lifestyle Protection.  
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Figure 5. Organization structure of Company X 
 
 
Figure 5 above shows the structure of the Company X branch. In the middle there is a 
dollar sign, which refers to the fact that processes, staff, shareholders etc. are driven by 
money. To make a profit, Company X needs good products, well-managed customer 
channels and loyal customers. To make these three particles work efficiently we need 
skilled employees, functional processes and systems as well as professional actuaries. In 
addition, laws and regulations must be obeyed and financial reporting must be flawless. 
An essential part of a life insurance company is reputation. Without a reliable reputation 
an insurance company has too large a burden to carry. The reputation is made with 
proper marketing but it is especially created by an attitude of doing things well and 
treating customer fairly. There are two lines leaving from the dollar mark, shareholders 
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and “Investment, Treasury, Capital”.  Shareholders demand return on their investment 
and in order to grow the company has to make investments. In the middle of the longer 
line stands Solvency 2 which has made some regulations for the insurance business. 
Due to capital requirement regulations for example, money stays in the reserves and 
cannot be invested. In the future, regulations might have more impact on the insurance 
business as Solvency 2 will be published in 2015. 
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6. DETECTING OPERATIONAL RISKS CASE: FINLAND / 
COMPANY X 
 
For the interviews I used an open-ended questionnaire. This proved to be the right 
choice when dealing with operational risks because operational risk management is still 
on a relatively low level and the operational risks affecting companies’ processes are 
identified in everyday tasks. Almost every employee somehow affects operational risk 
decisions. Of course large impact decisions are made at a senior management level.  
 
For example, typos are usually identified through controls but if there are no controls 
for a particular typo, an employee can refer it to a direct superior who can take the 
matter further and a control may be introduced in the future. This is a textbook example 
of low level action for operational risk management. Operational risk management is so 
broad that everybody participates in it in some way. 
 
In this digitalizing world, by far the most important point raised was technological 
development with system problems and system implementations. The insurance sector 
is particularly dependent on information systems. Insurance companies operate with 
information technology and if this does not work properly a company can say goodbye 
to its customers at an alarming rate. However, information technology was not the only 
operational risk raised in the interviews. In this chapter I will present and analyze the 
results from interviews. 
 
6.1 Data 
 
The data collected is from interviewed employers and managers from Finnish insurance 
companies and banks. Open-ended questionnaires were structured with 12 open 
questions. Questions were similar in both questionnaires, as shown below. The idea was 
to investigate operational risks in three time dimensions: past operational risks, present 
operational risks and future operational risks. A further aim was to examine what tools 
are used to manage these risks. The internal questionnaire was for interviewees from 
every section of Company X and so the responses are more diverse, although internal 
interviewees were not working directly with operational risks. 
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The credibility of the external questionnaire is based on the fact that every interviewee 
was a professional in operational risk management and therefore an appropriate person 
to analyze operational risks. 
 
I have interviewed 9 people from Company X. One of these people is working with 
operational risks and eight have an impact on operational risk management. In addition, 
I have interviewed 5 people outside Company X. All of these people are professional 
operational risk managers who deal with operational risks daily. They are from are other 
insurance companies in Finland. The interviews were carried out in Finnish and then 
translated into English.  
 
“There is no point worrying about things that cannot be controlled nor any commercial 
value in gathering information unless it may affect some decisions.” (Pezier, 2002) No 
commercial value in gathering information unless it may affect some decision. Answers 
from interviews support this statement. Companies gather information about operational 
risks with “loss events” recordings or realized operational risks recordings. Credit and 
market risk data has been collected in abundance. Credit and market risk have enjoyed 
years of  a standardized, globally applied, methodological approach. Internal operational 
risk data, however, is far from abundant even for most banks.  
 
Chapter 7.2 will present all the answers from the questionnaire. There will be 
differences and similarities between practice and theory and between different types of 
insurance companies. The answers will be allocated to categories or groups to help 
understand the relationship between different operational risks. The true value of this 
section is to create ideas and issues for further research. 
 
6.2 Internal Questionnaire 
 
When working with interviews it is important to realize that recent events will certainly 
have an impact on the interviewees’ responses but as we are dealing with operational 
risk it is more than welcome. As I have previously mentioned, everybody can be 
involved in operational risk management, operational risks occur in everyday tasks, and 
change with time. The more recent the realized operational risks, the closer we get to 
the optimal situation. The questions are not always presented in the same order as in the 
questionnaire because some questions are interrelated so are presented consecutively in 
order to facilitate understanding. All the internal interviews were held in the summer of 
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2014 when there were minor problems with the system in Company X. As a result, 
many similar points emerged. In question six, interviewees were asked about 
operational risks in their former workplace and how the tools used differed from the 
tools used at Company X. Unfortunately the answers remained too fragmented and 
deficient to bring any added value to this study therefore question number six will be 
excluded from the analysis of the questionnaire.  
 
Each of the nine interviewees mentioned the functionality of the system. There was a 
system stabilization project going on at that time, which probably meant that this topic 
was discussed more.  Functionality of the system is, however, also one of the topics 
raised recently by researchers and external interviewees. Our current era is very 
technology-dependent and therefore concerns about the functionality of systems are 
pertinent. One of the questions that asked of the interviewees was: How great a 
risk/threat is the development of technology and your company’s constantly growing 
dependence on it? The answers were quite interesting, as you can see from table 3. The 
answers are organized very simply into two categories, yes and no, with justifications. 
The numbers after the answer are number of responses. 
 
Four people said that it is a risk because of underdevelopment which creates risks for 
the company, three people think that if the company does not develop someone else 
will. The total of seven answers indicates that if the company does not react to 
technological development, it will face hard times ahead. This is one of the major risks 
in technological development. The generation born two decades ago, commonly known 
as a wired generation, demands services via the Internet. Windsor Holden put it nicely, 
"Young people have seen all these different facilities, adapted them and changed the 
means of communication." The whole communication system is changing and 
companies have to be able to provide services in quickly updating channels. This means 
that if a company cannot keep up with development it has no future, or at least the 
future does not look very bright. But is this an operational risk, a business risk or even a 
strategic risk? It could be a strategic risk if a company’s management saw it as a normal 
option not as a mandatory decision. Of course there are strategic risks when service 
providers are selected, but actually being able to meet the demand of technological 
development is no strategic decision. Is it then a business risk? Business risk is very 
close to strategic risk but there remain some slight differences.
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This table shows the answers to the question: How great a risk/threat is the development of technology 
and your company’s growing dependence on it? The answers are divided into yes with justifications and 
no with justifications. “Replies” show the number of the answers. 
 
Table 3. How great risk/threat is the development of the technology and its constantly growing 
dependence to your company? 
 
Which company is selected to help with information technology development is a 
business decision and creates business risks. Since the decision is mandatory, as 
mentioned before every company has to develop old information systems, and based on 
responses from interviewees and previous literature, I would say that it is a business risk 
which creates operational risks. It will also create external operational risks. If the 
selected supplier proves to be ineligible, it could cause substantial consequences. For 
example, when an insurance company has bought information technology services from 
a company that suddenly suffers crucial losses and therefore can no longer offer 
services. For this reason an insurance company has to think twice before outsourcing. 
Arguments	  for	  yes	   Replies	   Arguments	  for	  no	   Replies	  
Underdevelopment	  creates	  risks	  
4	  
Decreases	  operational	  risk,	  if	  
done	  right	   4	  
Hacking	  
3	  
Working	  would	  be	  more	  
effective	  and	  easier-­‐-­‐
>reducing	  operational	  risk	  
and	  open	  up	  new	  
opportunities	   3	  
If	  we	  do	  not	  develop	  someone	  else	  
will	   3	  
Less	  manual	  work-­‐-­‐>	  less	  
human	  risk	   2	  
Functionality	  of	  the	  information	  
system	  before	  the	  development	  
doubtful	   2	  
The	  more	  automated	  the	  
better	  -­‐-­‐>	  less	  mistakes-­‐-­‐>	  
less	  risk	   2	  
Multiplied	  dependence-­‐-­‐>	  growth	  in	  
operational	  risks	   1	  
It	  can	  create	  new	  approaches	  
to	  processes	   1	  
If	  there	  are	  unskilled	  people	  to	  
make	  changes.	  They	  have	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  see	  the	  big	  picture	  of	  the	  change	  
(which	  changes	  have	  a	  bigger	  
influence.	   1	  
Easier	  risk	  management	  
approaches	  
1	  
Very	  small	  mistake	  can	  cause	  very	  
big	  problems	   1	  
	   	  Pressure	  that	  more	  comprehensive	  
technology	  will	  fail	   1	   	  	   	  	  
	   16	   	   13	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Yet again the outsourcing decision is a business decision, which creates possible 
operational risks.  
 
On the contrary, four answers responded that technological development does not 
increase operational risks, if done correctly. This answer is supported with other no 
category answers; if the technological development is done correctly there will be less 
manual work, which means less human risk (2 answers). Also better information 
technology makes working more efficient and easier, which reduces operational risk 
and opens up more time for employees to focus on something else (3). Battling with a 
poor system reduces effectiveness significantly. Reducing operational risks with better 
information systems makes the operational risk management job more systematic (2) 
because operational risks are easier to control if there is no room for human error. 
Overall the more automated the system, the less room there is for human error and the 
less generation of operational risks (2). 
 
More than half of the responses expressed concerns about technological development. 
There were multiple reasons for concern. Many said in the interviews that technical 
development removes certain kinds of operational risks, but new operational risks take 
their place. Hacking came up three times, which is quite a small number considering 
that there have been several large-scale information leaks recently, such as Julian 
Assange or Raphael Grey. The insurance business, however, has remained relatively 
untouched by hackers, which was reflected in the answers. The one thing that hackers 
could steal is people’s personal information, which is still difficult to make use of. In 
addition, criminals’ interest is money and insurance companies do not deal with money 
in the same way as banks do. As it is extremely difficult to steal money straight from 
accounts, insurance companies have been left untouched. Prevention of operational risk 
caused by hacking is done with firewalls. The desired strength and coverage of the 
firewall depends on what resources management are willing to allocate to it. Losses 
caused by hackers are more or less in the form of reputational damage, nevertheless 
losses to insurance companies from hacking could need further research. 
 
The pressure that more comprehensive information technology will fail is mentioned in 
the answers only once. The same kind of argument is that very small mistakes can cause 
very big problems and comprehensive information technology will cause multiplied 
dependence. This means that there is a fear that information-technology’s role in the 
company’s everyday tasks is growing beyond people’s understanding. This is a 
reasonable concern but, as previously mentioned, technological development is 
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mandatory and therefore it is very important to do it right and not only cover a system’s 
deficiencies without looking at the big picture. This topic was raised in the context of 
almost every question so the importance of information technology will unfold during 
this section. 
 
In the questionnaire there are three simple questions where interviewees name 
operational risks. In addition, there is a question where interviewees name operational 
risks from the past, present and future. The answers of these questions have been put in 
a four-field matrix where the fields are system, people, processes and regulations, and 
external risks. Simply, risk caused by a system goes into the system field, risk caused by 
people goes to the people field, risk caused by failed or inadequate processes goes to the 
processes field and risk caused by regulations or external events goes to the last field. 
 
6.2.1 Single operational risks in four-fielded matrixes 
 
After checking whether the interviewee is familiar with the term operational risk, the 
second question was: would you mention a few realized operational risks that have 
occurred in Finland or worldwide? Again, information technology was by far the most 
popular answer. Everyone mentioned that the stabilization of the system is an 
operational risk that Company X is facing. The four-field matrix below is formed with 
the answers of question 2 so that the size of the figure depends on how many people 
have brought it up and the location of the figure depends on which category it is suitable 
for. For example, stabilization of the system is the biggest figure and it belongs to 
systems. However if some of the topics fit in both system and people or processes and 
system etc. it goes between those fields depending which has the stronger influence. 
 
Stabilization of the system was the one of the most mentioned subjects in this question 
and was brought up very often in the other questions too. This indicates the concerns 
about old and new systems and their functionality. System is also one of the four areas 
in the matrix and it is no coincidence that it is in people’s minds nowadays. Of course 
system stabilization is a relatively large part of systems and may be mentioned so often 
for this reason. Without going deeper into the letter problem, it can be said to be the 
result of failed internal testing and the complexity of the system. Failed internal testing 
moves the ellipse number two towards process and people. This means that the reasons 
behind this operational risk are also in failed processes and human error, not only the 
system. 
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The list above is formed from the answers of the interviewees in question 2. Answers have been put in to 
the four-field matrix so that the bigger ellipse the more references it has received.  Also the location of an 
ellipse depends on which category it belongs to most. 
 
1. Stabilization of the system 9. Mis-sold products (England) 
2. Letter Problems 10. Talvivaara 
3. Rogue traders 11. Enron scandal 
4. Subprime loan crisis 12. Malaysian airlines 
5. Failed data protection 13. Russian constraints 
6. Hacking (passwords) 14. Sonera deals in Germany 
7. Healthcare Norway 15. Nokia 
8. Bhopal 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Would you mention a few realized operational risks that have occurred in Finland or 
worldwide? 
 
Like letter problems, there are many other similar individual realized operational risks, 
which are in the matrix. These individual operational risks are mentioned only one time 
and one reasonable explanation for this is that there are countless numbers of similar 
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realized operational risks in the world and it would have been just a coincidence if two 
or more interviewees had mentioned the same unique operational risk. 
The third question was: What kind of daily operational risks does your company face? 
Again stabilization of the system was the most cited operational risk. This was not a 
surprise because employees work with the system daily and if the system is not working 
properly their work becomes a lot more difficult. Unlike question two, question three 
raised operational risks caused by people. Six interviewees brought up mistakes that 
people make and five interviewees brought up human risk. In this case, human risk is 
the risk that is caused as a result of limited resources. For example, if an expert is on 
sick leave and problems occur or the only person who might be able to help is not 
available. Therefore it is important that no single work is without a back-up person. If 
there is no back-up person the damage can “leak” somewhere else or multiply and 
create more operational risks. 
 
Let’s create a hypothetical situation where the IT expert is on sick leave and there is no 
replacement present. Now system errors have occurred and the employee (let’s call him 
John) in the claims service is not able to log in to his computer. Because John cannot 
log in to his computer, numerous applications for compensation from customers will not 
be handled and payments to customers cannot be made. Customers do not receive their 
payments, which they are expecting, causing resentment and reputational damage. Why 
would you buy insurance if the insurance company cannot pay compensation? Late 
payments and slow processing are not a good advertisement for an insurance company. 
Of course this kind of unpleasant situation needs realized human risk and errors in the 
system but this is what risk management is all about. Should we hire two IT guys to 
make it more unlikely that IT support is not available or is it too expensive compared to 
the risk that is created by having only one IT person. 
 
Nevertheless risk caused by human error was given a lot of attention in this question. 
When going a little deeper, interviewees related single examples of the risks caused by 
mistakes. Classic operational risks mentioned were mistakes in phone services, 
accounting errors, accidental false promises and the misinterpretation of the terms of 
compensation. In addition, bad communication and mis-priced products were 
mentioned. The largest ellipses are in the fields of system and people but regulation 
external risks, as well as processes, have not been ignored. The main point in the four-
field matrix below, when comparing these answers to other matrices and external 
answers, is the location of the ellipses. 
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The list above is formed from the answers of the interviewees to question 3. Answers have been put in the 
four-field matrix so that the bigger the ellipse the more references it has received.  Also the location of an 
ellipse depends on which category it belongs to most. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. What kind of daily operational risks does your company face? 
 
When comparing these two matrices above, the number of different operational risk 
events is striking. Interviewees mentioned many more single events when it comes to 
1. Letter problems 15. Partners mis-selling products 
2. Staying with the digitalization 16. Poor instructions 
3. Mailing problems 17. Mistakes of the people 
4. Reminder invoices 18. Communication 
5. Failed data protection 19. Following the budget 
6. Interruption of the functions 20. Problems in the processes 
7. Payment transactions 21. Controls 
8. Stabilization of the system 22. SLA 
9. Supplier risk/partner risk 23. Blackouts/fire/burglary 
10. Misinterpretation of the terms of compensation 24. Terms too open to interpretation 
11. Accidently false promises  25. Global economic situation 
12. Mis-priced products 26. Reputational risk 
13. Accounting 27. Limited resources 
14. Mistakes in phone services 28. Human risk 
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their own company. The ellipses in the second matrix clearly focus on the system and 
people. The sizes of the ellipses are larger in system and people too. This indicates that 
operational risks caused by systems or people are more common in everyday tasks than 
risks caused by regulations and external risks, or processes but this is rather usual in the 
theory of operational risk. Operational risks caused by people are usually minor risks 
and they occur more often. Answers concerning the system can be explained by today’s 
system-dependent working habits. People are working with the system every day and if 
the system is not working properly productivity suffers. A poorly functioning system 
causes operational risks every day. 
 
However, the four biggest single events were stabilization of the system (9), human 
error (6), human risks (5) and communication (4). Human error and human risks can 
simply be put in the people section, but communication is a bit more complex. 
Communication usually means interaction between coworkers or between employees in 
general. Nevertheless communication includes processes as well. If the processes are 
not solid, communication can be weak. Let’s look at the simple process where an 
employee discusses with a customer via e-mail and does not include any other notes or 
documents. This particular employee then resigns and his or her e-mail is removed. This 
kind of case could cause a situation where there is no evidence of what has been agreed. 
But if an employee writes down this agreed matter in a shared folder where everybody 
can check later, the above-mentioned situation does not arise. Without proper processes 
communication can be poor and so communication is placed towards processes, 
although it is still people who communicate with each other. 
 
Let’s go back to the case where information is lost because of failed processes. This 
kind of situation may cause the loss a customer and, even worse, it can create broad 
reputational damage if the customer, for example, shares his/her experiences on social 
media or the media in general. Every event that directly or indirectly affects customers 
creates or, at least may create, reputational damage. For this reason, reputational 
damage needs to be taken into consideration almost every time when an operational risk 
occurs and of course before the risk is realized. 
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The list below is formed from the answers of the interviewees to question 11. Answers have been put in 
to the four-field matrix so that the bigger the ellipse the more references it has received.  Also the location 
of an ellipse depends on which category it belongs to most. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. What is in your opinion the single largest realized operational risk? And how do you think it 
could have been prevented? 
 
 
The third four-field matrix is formed on the basis of the 11th question on possible 
operational risks that could happen in the future. Now the answers started to move 
1. Digital innovations 
2. Systems in general 13. Service providers/channels of distribution 
3. Communication 14. Limited sale channels 
4. Lack of risk assessment 15. Skilled labor hard to get 
5. Better operating systems for customers 16. Systematization 
6. Competitors ahead in digitalization 17. EU amendment 
7. Mis-sold products 18. Company for sale 
8. Hacking 19. Unable to follow the change 
9. Human risks 20. Investment operation failure 
10. Information security 21. Agreements must be long-term 
11. Increasing longevity 22. Industry competitors 
12. Reputational damage caused by human mistakes 23. Regulations 
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towards the field of regulation and external risks. This could mean that regulation and 
external risks concern people more than, for example, risks caused by humans. There 
are two big ellipses in the system field system in general (2) and digital innovations (1). 
Interviewees believe that operational risks caused by systems will be important in the 
future as well as today. Digital innovations move towards external risks because 
external parties are expected to set requirements for digital developments, then 
companies try to keep up with the development. This causes very big operational risks, 
for example, when the company decides to renew their information technology. The 
next figure displays what kind of different operational risks might possibly arise when 
renewing information technology. The decision to renew information technology is no 
operational risk itself but it can, and often will, create different kinds of operational 
risks. It is very common that one operational risk creates another when realized and it is 
essential to understand what those risks are. It is highly unlikely that all of the risks or 
events in figure seven would become real, but one should still be aware of the risks. 
 
As we can see from the figure below, renewing information technology can create a 
large number of operational risks. It is risk management’s duty to analyze which 
operational risks in the figure the company should pay attention to, manage, entirely 
avoid or leave alone because of the resources spend with respect to the losses that 
realized operational risk could cause. 
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Figure 9. Reforming information technology 
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6.2.2 Identification, calculation and prioritizing operational risks 
 
In the table four there are eight different events that can create operational risks. Events 
are picked up from the matrixes into rather different example to introduce the risks. The 
idea of the table is to go deeper in the risk. What might be the consequences and the 
expenses of the risks? Some of the risks are minor and some of them are quite broad.  
As we can see almost always one of the expenses is reputational damage. The “fact” 
that all kind of publicity is in favor does not apply for insurance companies. However it 
is very important to a company to discuss somewhat like this to make sure that all 
possible consequences are known and understood. Because having full knowledge of 
the risks that the firm is taking is a fundamental pillar of the operational risk 
management. Every company should clarify what are consequences of different 
operational risks. It is obvious that different business sectors have different operational 
risks and different consequences after an operational risk has occurred. Nevertheless in 
life insurance business there are quite similar operational risks despite which Life 
Insurance Company is selected. 
 
The last sector in the table 4 is an example how companies could analyze their risks. 
First number is probability of the risk and second number is expense of the risk. 
Numbers have been categorized 1-3 so that number 1 is low probability, number 2 is 
medium probability and number 3 is high probability. Second number is expense and 
the system is same in here, number 1 is low expense, number 2 is medium expense and 
number 3 is high expense. When operational risk managers have discussed and decided 
on which risks get which numbers they can focus on those risks that have obtained 
larger numbers in both categories.  For example 3+3 is high volatility high impact risk 
so the company should invest more time and resources to manage it. Actually company 
should never drift into situation where there is high impact high volatility risk. It is also 
highly unusual that firm is facing risk that could drive it into bankruptcy and yet the risk 
occurs every one in a while. At least that kind of company cannot be very long lasting. 
Numbers that have been putted in the table are estimated on the basis of former theory 
and interviews. They are estimates and every company has to estimate numbers by 
themselves. 
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There are 9 operational risks in this figure. First column contain the operational risk and the next column 
contain possible effects that it could cause. Third column include the expenses that the risk might cause. 
Likelihood + expenses column tells the value of the overall impact of the risk with a specific scale. All 
values have been explained beneath the table. 
 
Table 4. Likelihood +expenses 
 
 
Risk	   Effect	   Expenses	   Likelihood	  +	  expenses	  
Unstable system If system is not stable --> 
makes the work of the 
employees more difficult-
-> delays in the 
processing and payments, 
employee's well being 
Fatigue employees medical 
expenses --> replacement 
expenses, delays --> loss 
of customers and 
reputational damage 
3x2	  
Mistakes of the people 
(e.g. Typos) 
More clearing work--> 
other works might be 
delayed. Mistakes 
situations where dealing 
with money 
Compensations because of 
the mistakes --> discounts, 
or even fines 
3x1	  
Communication Failed or poor 
communication --> failed 
processes --> 
misunderstood or un 
received messages --> 
incorrect work--> internal 
work more difficult 
Additional work --> delays 
in processing--> discounts 
or fines 
3x1	  
Regulations One should closely 
monitor the development 
of the regulations, 
changing regulations --> 
changes to the processes -
-> more work 
More work --> more 
human resources --> more 
expenses 
2x2	  
Human risk Tasks may be neglected, 
important person missing-
-> could affect everybody 
else’s work 
Delays in the processing 
and payments  --> 
discounts to customer or 
fines to the company 
2x1	  
Terms too open to 
interpretation 
Wrong messages to 
customers --> litigation --
> reputational damage 
Court fees, reputational 
damage--> loss of 
customers 
1x2	  
Digital innovations 
(external) 
Improvements to 
information technology --
> employees do not know 
how to use new systems -
-> delays in the 
processing and payments 
--> employee's well being 
Employees training costs, 
delays--> fines --> 
reputational damage --> 
loss of customers, fatigue 
employees medical 
expenses --> replacement 
expenses 
1x3	  
Mis-sold products Wrong messages to 
customers --> litigation --
> reputational damage --> 
worse, lose license to sell 
insurances 
Court fees, reputational 
damage--> loss of 
customers 
1x3	  
Information security Lose customer data, abuse 
of the confidential 
customer data 
Reputational damage--> 
customer losses, fines 
1x3	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The first risk in the table above is unstable (ICT?) systems. The probability of unstable 
systems is the highest (3) that risk can get on this scale. It is given a rating of 3 because 
an unstable system seems to be always present whenever operational risk is mentioned. 
In addition, every interviewee has mentioned an unstable system and interviewees also 
mentioned that they have to deal with unstable systems every day. However, 
determining the costs of unstable systems is much harder to do. Unstable systems can 
create minor events such as e-mail not working, but can also create devastating errors 
where the functions of the whole company are interrupted. Because of the large scale of 
impact, unstable systems were given an expense rating of 2. By contrast, human error 
was at least as common as an unstable system, but human error is often less expensive. 
That is why human error received a score of 3+1.  
 
Human error often occurs less than once a week, so the probability of human error has 
been rated as 2 and the expenses that it could cause are scaled to the lowest 
measurement. Even the worse kind of expenses caused by human error should not 
threaten the viability of the company.  In addition, terms that are too open to 
interpretation rarely cause bankruptcy. Usually in the insurance business, contract terms 
are solid (OR carefully written), but still insurance companies cannot completely avoid 
situations where customers disagree with the company on how to interpret terms. 
However, this kind of case only occurs a few times a year in Finland; the related 
expenses consist of fines or litigation costs. 
 
Digital innovations are common nowadays compared to a decade ago. However, 
insurance companies do not update their systems every time new technologies appear 
Digital innovation might cause situations where systems are suddenly out of date.  
Regularly updating information and terms can be very expensive and it might also 
create numerous new operational risks. Thus the probability of digital innovation is 
rated as 1 and the expense is rated as 3. The occurrence of digital innovation may rise in 
the future and it already seems that companies are struggling with old information 
technology. In relation, information security is widely discussed in today’s financial 
sector. The financial sector has already witnessed a couple of information security 
failures, which have caused major financial and reputational losses. Financial 
organizations do not want to lose further credibility in the eyes of their customers. 
However, large information security failures are still quite rare in the insurance 
business, which is why the probability of operational risk caused by failed information 
technology is rated as 1. But losses can be devastating in the reputational and financial 
sense; therefore those expenses are rated as 3. 
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Failed communication is rather a broad area of risk, but at the same time quite clear. All 
kinds of communication that failed to deliver the message forward are recognized as 
failed communication. Failed or poor communication occurs in everyday work. Failed 
communication does not always create direct losses, but do result in wasted time and 
additional work à probability 3; expenses 1. 
 
Increased regulation is one thing that will affect insurance companies as it has already 
affected banks. Changes in regulation will have an effect on insurance companies’ 
revenues, if they have not already. Regulators give fines to those insurance companies 
that failed to follow regulations. Nevertheless, regulatory changes do not happen 
frequently, even though they are highly topical. Regulations get probability rate of 2 and 
expenses rate of 2. 
 
Periodically, insurance products have been sold to a customer for the wrong reasons, 
either accidently or on purpose. These kinds of mis-sold products are almost impossible 
to control. However mis-sold products, which are presented in this table, are more 
related to situations where there are a lot of similar products that have been sold for the 
same reason. In the insurance business it could be that a product that is found to be 
illegal and all the payments have to be returned to customers. Illegal insurance products 
result in fines, reputational damage, court fees and even loss of the insurance license. 
Mis-sold products on a large scale are quite rare in Finland and obviously insurance 
companies try to avoid mis-selling at any price, because the worst-case scenario could 
be devastating; like loss of sales rights. The probability of mis-sold products is 1 and 
expenses that it could cause are 3. 
 
In question number five, employees at Company X were asked how they see 
identification, calculation and prioritizing of operational risks in Company X. It should 
be noted that some of the interviewees are working more with operational risks than 
others, so the answers cover almost all functions in operational risk management. The 
next figure has been formed on the basis of how operational risks are identified, 
calculated and prioritized. Figure 11 will show the phases Company X goes through 
when identifying, calculating and prioritizing operational risks. Identification starts with 
monitoring operational risks, in which everybody can be involved. For example, an 
employee who is working in claims services finds out that it is pointless to pass 
customer-specific information on a single document between business sections, when it 
can be done satisfactorily once in a week with a single excel report. These kinds of 
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findings usually facilitate and expedite processes as well as helping to control 
operational risk. However, operational risks are to be recorded, especially if they are not 
dealt with, and require resources and actions.  
 
Recorded operational risks have to be looked through and this is where risk owners 
come into the picture. Risk owners are named persons who report about processes and 
operational risks to operational risk management. Risk owners report their own 
operational risks via the Bwise system. Operational risk management then identifies the 
most important risks, which need more actions or permission from senior management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Identification, calculation and prioritizing operational risks. 
 
 
With tight monitoring and clear reporting the company can save resources and facilitate 
employees work. In addition, operational risks that have been spotted before they have 
caused any costs, usually come from the reports that risks owners and operational risk 
management are working with. Operational risks can also be identified with controls. 
However, operational risks spotted using controls end up in reports that have been 
documented in the Bwise systen. 
 
Company X calculates operational risks for reserves. But yet again, the tool that they 
use is rather simple. One of the operational risks is incorrectly- decisioned claims. It has 
been estimated to cause a 50 000 € impact to a company; it is also quite likely to happen 
so the reserve that has to be putted aside is 50 000 €. By contrast, if operational risk 
management asses that incorrectly-decisioned claims are an unlikely operational risk, 
the reserve would be only 10 000 €. In one way or another, these reserve calculations 
are based on historical data and the experience of operational risk management. This is 
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one section that would need further research in order to get more specific calculations 
so that reserves would not be too large or too small. 
 
Prioritizing began with watchlists, which posses operational risks that could need 
further action and specific surveillance. A watchlist is just a tool that helps operational 
risk management to illustrate the overall picture. A watchlist is also a tool for 
employees to raise different operational issues. However, operational risks that are on a 
watchlist still require actions and risk owners or team managers demand these actions 
from senior management or operational risk management. Everybody wants resources 
for their risks, which is why they have to justify presicely why their risks need further 
resources. Nevertheless, internal interviewees thought that Company X should spend 
more time on operational risk management, because too often operational risks remain 
at the watchlist level and employees sit back and wait forsomething to happen. Too 
many operational risks are left without any actions before they become urgent. 
 
Operational risk management decides which operational risks are most urgent and 
which ones deserve more resources. The most urgent operational risks are usually the 
ones that are already realized and need rapid reaction in addition to risks that might 
already have caused damage to the company. The most urgent operational risks are 
usually allocated additional resources, because the company might suffer losses all the 
time until the risk has been fixed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Identification, calculation and prioritizing operational risks. 
 
In identification following monitoring (in which every employee can be involved), risk 
owners select a few important operational risks to enter into the Bwise system. Then 
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operational risk managers gather all the risks that risk owners have entered in the 
operational risk report, which is then presented to senior risk management once a year. 
However, operational risks might need legal professionals to give their legal opinion. 
Legal professionals know better for example regulatory demands and therefore they are 
involved in identification processes. Swinging risks are risks which have been assessed 
by the risk owners as usual, but senior risk management have sent them back with 
critical comments after they have evalauted the risks themselves. Risks can swing 
between these groups until senior risk management finally agree to add them to the 
company’s risk profile. Then the risk profile is agreed by the premium risk committee 
and the final document is the tool for communication with regulators. Prioritizing is 
done almost with the same audit trail with one exeption, risk controllers. Control 
owners are more spread around the organization, which is how different operational 
risks are managed more specifically and efficiently.  
 
 
 
6.2.3 Past, present and future operational risks 
 
The last part of the internal questionnaire deals with past, present and future operational 
risks as well as mis-sold products and how Company X could have been prepared better 
for operational risks that occurred. Table 5 gives an overview of question 7 where 
interviewees mentioned operational risks from the past, present and future. Table 5 
shows clearly that the system is present in all three categories. This means that system-
related operational risks are the most important operational risks in Company X. 
System-related operational risks have been raised in almost every question from which 
we can draw the conclusion that Company X could allocate more resources to systems 
and IT management. However, systems were not the only operational risk that 
interviewees raised. In the past there were claims mistakes, which are common in the 
insurance business. Every insurance company in the world has faced claims mistakes. 
Some of these mistakes are caused by human error; some of them might be occur 
because there is something wrong with the insurance terms (reference?). Claim mistakes 
caused by human error are usually single events and do not cause large expenses for a 
company, but poor insurance terms might cause multiple false claim decisions. For 
insurance companies this is obviously a very important area to control, which is how a 
company avoids additional expenses and reputational damage. Claims mistakes can also 
result in fines from regulators. 
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In 2012, regulators decided that men and women should pay the same premiums for 
their insurance, although the health risks are different between genders (reference). 
Gender-neutral pricing is a perfect example of regulatory operational risk, which has 
caused a direct influence on insurance companies’ daily operations. Gender-neutral 
pricing is a relatively new regulatory requirement, so the effects are still quite unknown 
and would need further research. 
 
Would you mention the order of five or more biggest/most important operational risks regarding your 
company in the following categories: a) Already realized operational risks b) Currently faced operational 
risks c) Possible operational risks emerging in the future (numbers next to operational risk is the number 
of times a particular risk was mentioned by the interviewees) 
 
Table 5. Past, present and future operational risks 
 
Past	   	  	  
System 6 
Letter problems 4 
Claims mistakes 2 
Gender-neutral pricing 3 
Lack of resources 2 
Present   
System 9 
Letter problems 9 
Invoice problems 4 
Problems in projects 2 
Future   
System 7 
Law reforms 5 
Political reform 5 
Continuity (Partner relationships) 5 
Technological development 3 
 
 
System, letter and invoice problems were all mentioned when interviewees were asked 
about present operational risks. These are all system-related operational risks and some 
of them could be visible to customers as well, which might cause customer losses and 
reputational damage. Answers concerning the system can be explained with today’s 
system-dependent working habits. People work with systems every day and if the 
systems do not work properly, labor productivity suffers. A poorly functioning system 
causes minor operational risks every day, which is why system is mentioned in all three 
categories. System-related risks are clearly the biggest and most important operational 
risks that Company X has nowadays. Along with the system, interviewees brought up 
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legal reforms and political reforms when asked about future operational risks. In 
addition, they expressed their concern about business continuity and technological 
development.   
 
Legal reforms and political reforms are both regulatory operational risks, which have 
had a significant impact on the financial sector in recent years. Regulators have taken 
more responsibility for certain issues, which might affect the security of investors’ 
investments and consumers’ insurances. Interviewees believed that this kind of trend is 
will continue, which is why they specifically mentioned legal reforms and political 
reforms as one of the biggest operational risks in the future. Regulation as a whole has 
also been widely discussed in the media following the recent financial crisis. However, 
interviewees do not consider regulatory risks as present operational risks, which 
indicate that these kinds of risks have, as yet, no effect on daily actions, but people are 
still aware of them.  
 
Whether it would be possible to prevent already occurred risks or not, is easy to say 
afterwards, however the eighth question is about how Company X could have avoided 
the risks occurred in the past and how Company X could have been better prepared for 
realized operational risks. 
 
Table 6. Prevention of operational risks 
 
How Company X could have 
avoided the risks? 
	  	   How Company X could have 
been better prepared? 
Comedy of errors 	  	   Project preparations should be better 
Finnish brand should be more 
involved in IT changes 
	  	   Better internal project management 
Continuity of IT specialist 	  	   More resources 
Own IT help to Finland 	  	   Sufficient testing of IT changes 
More efficient processes 	  	   More controls/ better controls 
System implementations went 
through too quickly 
	  	   Keeping key employees 
Deficiencies of the system 	  	   Recovery management 
More IT testing 	  	   	  	  
Better communication 	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As one interviewee said, “this operational risk was a comedy of errors”, which means 
that this particular operational risk needed a couple of failures before it occurred. Large 
operational risks usually need a comedy of errors. It was not one button that blew up the 
nuclear power plant of Chernobyl. It needed numerous system and human errors to 
happen before disaster was ready. A comedy of errors is hard to avoid, but companies 
can affect the series of events so that the probabilities of events are reduced.. This can 
be done with more controls or better processes. However, an institution like a power 
plant needs to make absolutely certain that it does not leak or explode, where 
institutions like an insurance company can be exposed more to the risk of a comedy of 
errors. 
 
More than that, Company X should be more involved in IT changes so that system 
related operational risks would not occur as a result of bad communication between IT 
and the Finnish branch. Risks could also have been avoided with better IT testing. 
Needless to say that IT testing is a vital part of the insurance companies’ daily 
processes. If the system implementations are rushed through too quickly, it increases 
almost every time the risks that something goes wrong. Although some of the 
implementations have to be rushed through quickly, the company should be more aware 
of other impacts that the implementation might cause. Systems are often quite fragile, 
which means that corrections, for example to invoicing, might have an impact on other 
system properties. This kind of lack of awareness is due to the fact that IT specialists do 
not necessary have the sufficient level of knowledge about processes in Finland so 
repair decisions do not take into account all relevant angles. Taking this into account 
Company X should have its own IT specialist to ensure better continuity. 
 
A large part of the functioning of the system is communication. If the communication 
between people and departments is limited and poor, it significantly affects the 
operations of the company. Poor communication between operations and the IT 
specialist weaken the functionality of the system. The better the picture of the practices 
the encoder has, the easier it is to make the right corrections the first time, without any 
complications.  
 
However, every company faces problems every now and then, which is why 
preparations for operational risks are important. Interviewees mentioned a few ways 
that Company X could have been better prepared better for the operational risks that it 
has faced. Project preparations should have been organized better. Management should 
select people more carefully for projects and the people who have been selected should 
	   62	  
plan more carefully the steps and the progression of the project. These are two easy 
tasks that can be done at the beginning of the project. In addition, operations almost 
always need more resources, however in this current economic situation resources are 
hard to come by and therefore additional resources are not usually allocated.  
  
Nevertheless, controls are a great way to improve preparedness for operational risks. 
Operations should focus deeply on controls that would facilitate the working 
environment. Controls cannot be too rigid, because this may cause delays and 
frustration among employees. An excessively rigid working environment may hamper 
the retention of key employees because annoying and inconvenient practices and 
policies could have an effect on the working atmosphere. It is vital to maintain a 
positive working atmosphere if a company wants to keep key employees. The retention 
of key employees is very important to a company like Company X because the 
education and training of a new employee is quite slow and expensive. Also, more 
experienced employees can operate much faster and provide a more professional touch. 
More experienced employees can take more responsibility and develop new or better 
controls and policies.  
 
However, interviewees all agreed that Company X should have more organized and 
better recovery management. Recovery management is highly important when 
operational risk arises. A company that is exposed to operational risks should be 
prepared to manage different kinds of areas of operational risk, of which reputational 
and regulatory are very important. This is because these risks might have large tail 
losses and could easily be forgotten. If a company does not manage reputational risk 
properly it could cause customer and financial losses. In addition, regulatory risks 
should be dealt with immediately in order to avoid fines. If recovery management is at 
an inadequate level in a company, the consequences might be fatal. 
 
The last question introduced here is about interviewees’ previous job and how 
operational risks were different there. Employees that were interviewed have been 
working at Company X for a while now, which had an effect on answers to question 10. 
Some of the interviewees could not mention any operational risks from the previous job. 
That is, question number 10 (How do operational risks differ between Company X and 
your previous workplace?) did not bring any additional value to this study, which is 
why it has been left little attention. Why was it much harder to talk about operational 
risks from previous jobs? There could be multiple reasons for this, for example, 
employees do not remember, or there is no previous workplace, but the actual reason 
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could be that operational risk, as a risk category, is rather new. Therefore, it was quite 
impossible to mention any operational risks from the past because 10 years ago 
operational risk was a relatively uncommon concept. 
 
6.3 External Questionnaire 
 
In this chapter the answers from the external questionnaire are presented. Five people 
outside Company X have been interviewed and every one of these people is a 
professional operational risk manager who deals daily with operational risks. They are 
from are other insurance companies in Finland. These insurance companies are different 
from Company X in many ways, actually one of them is a global banking group which 
will give a little a bit perspective to this section. Two of them are Mutual Pension 
Insurance Companies, which means that they have to obey different regulations and 
legislation. They have similar and different operational risks than other insurance 
companies. One of provides retail and commercial banking services as well as insurance 
services. Last Insurance Company offers general insurance such as motor vehicle 
insurance or house insurance.  
 
In this chapter the answers from the external questionnaire are presented. Questions are 
not always presented in the same order as they were asked in the questionnaire. This is 
because some questions are related to others and the related questions are presented 
consecutively in order to facilitate understanding of the connections between questions. 
The answers are presented in different figures and tables, the same as in the internal 
questionnaire chapter. This is because it is clearer to compare the answers in the next 
chapter. It is also easier for the reader to understand the similarities and differences 
between the internal and external questionnaires. This chapter starts with the already 
familiar four-field matrices and continues then to the interpretation of other answers. 
 
All the four-field matrices below are formed with the answers of question 2 so that size 
of the figure depends on how many people have brought it up and the location of the 
figure depends on which category it is suitable for. For example, system breakdown is 
the biggest figure and it belongs to systems. However, if some of the topics fit in both 
system and people, or processes and system etc. it goes between those fields, depending 
on which has the stronger influence. 
The first matrix from the external answers includes all kinds of operational risks around 
the world. With just a quick look it can be said, unl
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there are more answers that go into the field of regulation and external risk. Also more 
minor risks do not get too much attention here. It can be explained by the respondents’ 
job assignments. External interviewees were professional in the field of operational risk 
management. This means that they may have a wider picture of operational risks and 
therefore the answers show some differences as well. 
  
Nevertheless, in the first external matrix, regulation and external risks, system and 
people get attention when processes are left more untouched. Of course the ellipses can 
be placed almost everywhere depending on the point of view. However these ellipses 
have been located from the perspective of the interviewees. The answers to question 2 
are diverse and only three answers earned two references. These three answers were 
system breakdown, VR (State-owned Railway Company in Finland) system 
implementation and rogue traders. System breakdown is easily located in the system, 
but system implementations include more than just system caused operational risks. 
There is usually a lot of planning and testing before implementation. If testing, for 
example, has been insufficient the implementation could be devastating for a company. 
System implementation is also sensitive to human error. For this reason VR system 
implementation is closer to the people field than system breakdown. By contrast, rogue 
traders have been located in the people field close to regulation and external risks and 
processes. Rogue trader is more than just the greed of one person. There has to be 
deficiencies in controls and processes to make it even possible. In addition, there are 
often problems with regulatory compliance. There has to be opportunity but in the end it 
is a person who commits the abuse. 
 
There were a couple of other answers related to regulatory compliance, such as the 
Libor scandal where a handful of the biggest banks in the world manipulated the 
interbank lending rates. UBS is one of the banks involved in the Libor scandal. UBS got 
unpleasant publicity also when a rogue trader from the bank was caught. Controls and 
processes failed twice in a short time at UBS. EU regulators fined JP Morgan for 
involvement in the Libor scandal. JP Morgan’s fines were 72 million Euros while UBS’ 
fines were 12.7 million Euros. Société Générale was also involved in the Libor scandal. 
These banks did not follow regulations, but processes and controls failed also. With 
controls, companies try to, for example, prevent opportunities where an employee could 
abuse their position. Especially when the economy is in recession, the financial pressure 
people are under can grow unbearable, which can lead to abuse. Of course controls have 
other functions as well. With controls a company tries to prevent human error.. Controls 
work also for processes and the support structure.  
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Under the second question it can be said that external interviewees think that 
operational risks caused by regulations or regulatory compliance should be under the 
supervision of the company. Operational risks caused by people were also raised in the 
second question. Operational risks caused by project management or operations against 
regulations are located in the people field. For the success of the project it is highly 
important to select the right people to manage the project. If a company fails to choose 
competent management for a single project, multiple operational risks could occur. 
With bad management, the schedule of the project could be delayed, which means lost 
working hours. Lost working hours can be transferred straight to lost money. However, 
if the project fails to achieve the desired result it would be an even worse scenario. This 
kind of situation could be avoided with proper project management selection 
procedures.  
 
As well as project management, the operations against regulations are mainly due to 
human actions. People can try to make profits by intentionally violating rules of 
regulators. This kind of abuse is prevented with controls, but not all controls apply 
when the abuser is on senior management level. However, abuse committed by 
intentionally is quite rare. More often, regulations are broken when a company fails to 
monitor changes in regulations. Nowadays regulations change more often than a decade 
ago, so companies must devote more resources to monitoring different regulators. An 
internationally operating European company may have to follow regulations at the local 
level, at the country level and regulations from the EU and the USA. Operations 
contrary to  regulations are usually “rewarded” with fines from the regulators. Large 
fines are often reported in the media, leading to reputational damage. As it can be seen 
from the matrix above, one of the ellipses is in the middle of the fields. Reputational 
damage is an operational risk that can be caused by any of the four fields in the matrix. 
Processes are left quite alone and the only one is “problems in processes”. Although it is 
left alone it does not mean that it is not important. Actually processes are often involved 
when talking about controls and therefore it will be discussed further in this 
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The list above is formed from the answers of the interviewees in question 2. Answers have been put in the 
four-field matrix so that the bigger the ellipse the more references it has received.  Also the location of an 
ellipse depends on which category it belongs to most. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Would you mention a few realized operational risks that have occurred in Finland or 
worldwide? 
 
 
After general operational risks, the interviewees were asked about operational risks in 
their own companies. In the third question interviewees mentioned 26 different 
operational risks, which are more or less part of companies risk identifications. Again, 
functioning of the systems was raised more than once. The three most mentioned 
operational risks were old systems, system breakdown and typographical errors (Typos) 
all mentioned three times. In addition, risks that were mentioned two times were data 
1. System breakdown 10. Libor scandal 
2. VR system implementation 11. Société Géneralé 
3. Rogue traders 12. UBS 
4. System implementations 13. J&P Morgan fines 
5. Hacking 14. Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
6. Compliance of the procedures 15. Blackout 
7. Project management 16. Eläke Tapiola mess 
8. Problems in processes 17. Reputational damage 
9. Operations against regulations 
	   67	  
run crashes, system implementations, information security, communication, 
functionality of the processes and agreement practices.  
 
The list above is formed from the answers of the interviewees in question 3. Answers have been put in the 
four-field matrix so that the bigger the ellipse the more references it has received.  Also the location of an 
ellipse depends on which category it belongs to most. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. What kind of daily operational risks your company face? 
 
1. Old systems 14. Phone service 
2. System breakdown 15. Insuring mistakes 
3. Typos 16. Project risks 
4. Data run crashes 17. Quality of the data 
5. System implementations 18. Partner risk 
6. Information security 19. Statutory customers 
7. Communication 20. Reputational damage 
8. Functionality of the processes 21. Media 
 9. Agreement practices 22. Following the regulations 
10. E-mail does not work 23. Local authorities 
11. Phishing messages 24. Money laundering 
12. Know-how 25. Terrorism regulations 
13. Actuaries calculations 26. Legislation 
	   68	  
From the nine most mentioned risks five are located in the system field, this indicates 
that firms are forced to update their old and weak systems. When firms are renew their 
information technology, new operational risks usually occur. If old and new systems do 
not communicate well enough, it could cause data losses, failures in information 
security, data run crashes and even system breakdowns. Nowadays, many firms struggle 
with fast developing information technology so it is not surprising that operational risks 
related to systems were mentioned often in the questionnaire. 
 
Along with system, the people field got multiple answers from interviewees. Risks 
caused by human actions are quite typical operational risks. For example, typos 
(typographical errors) are always present when people are working with computers or 
other devices. A classic example of a typo could be when an employee accidentally 
types the wrong account number and payments vanish somewhere they should not go. 
Controls are the best way to try to avoid typos. System which send warning message to 
the computer screen when numbers are wrong, is a basic control to avoid typos. Even 
controls cannot completely eliminate the risks of typos, but controls should at least 
expose mistakes before they cause irreversible consequences. The second biggest ellipse 
in the people field is communication. Although communication is located in the people 
field it is linked to system and processes. Bad communication is usually people’s faults, 
but sometimes, poor processes or incapable systems do not suit reasonable 
communication. For this reason communication slides towards processes and system, 
but still stays in the people field.  
 
Other operational risks in the people section would be know-how, actuaries’ 
calculations, phone service mistakes and insuring mistakes. Employees’ know-how 
firmly depends on the level of training that the firm offers, but also hiring the right 
people to do the job is important. Sometimes it is quite hard to find the perfect 
employee, especially when a new employee is replacing a former one. Let’s image a 
situation where a Norwegian employee leaves a Finnish company and the empty place 
has to be filled in a month so that delays remain manageable. A requirement for the job 
is that the candidate has to speak Norwegian. There is a limited number of Norwegians 
living in Finland, not to mention that someone would be available for hire and qualified 
for the job. Now in the first place the company faces a human risk because the 
replacement is difficult to find. Secondly, because of the language requirement, there 
are a limited number of candidates, which could lead to the hiring of an unqualified 
person. 
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As we can see, ellipses have formed a cluster in the regulations and external risks field. 
All of the risks in the cluster are on an equal position. Phishing, partner risk and media 
are external risks and controlling them is quite hard because they have their own 
interests. Phishing can be controlled through proper communication with customers. 
This kind of activity has not been a matter of concern for insurance companies so far. 
For example, banks’ customers receive phishing messages every once in a while when 
someone is trying to acquire account information and passwords. Banks inform 
customers how to react when facing phishing messages, but in the end it is the 
responsibility of the customer to recognize fake messages. However, operational risks 
caused by partners and the media are more significant to an insurance company than 
phishing messages. Partners are vital for insurance companies like Company X.  
Company X partners in Finland, banks, sell Company X’s products to end customers.  
Needless to say, partners are vital to every company, but some partners are easier to 
replace than others.  Mutual pension insurance companies need partners to transfer 
information between mutual pension insurance companies. Every Finnish citizen has 
their salary information in the possession of the company, which operates between 
different pension insurance companies, for example, exchanging information between 
the companies. Mutual pension insurance companies have a special relationship with 
the media. That is, Finnish people have to pay a pension payment from their salary. So 
these companies have a statutory position and therefore they are under the scrutiny of 
the media. It is very hard to control the media as if it were just another operational risk. 
The media works independently and can create reputational damage to a company if 
necessary. Controlling the media is not impossible. Working with the media is better 
than trying to avoid it as much as possible. The cluster also includes ellipses that are 
strongly related to regulations. 
 
External interviewees raised different kinds of operational risks that follow regulations: 
Statutory customers for mutual pension insurance companies, money laundering, 
terrorist regulations, local authorities, legislation and following the regulations in 
general for all insurance companies. Statutory customers mean that mutual pension 
insurance companies have to accept every one as their customer if asked, because of the 
legislation in Finland. As mentioned before, the most harm from regulations and local 
authorities, along with legislation, is that companies have to be constantly aware of the 
changes in regulations and legislation. If a company is not aware of some regulation it 
could lead to compliance issues, which can lead to fines and reputational damage. 
Following the regulations has increased continuously. One of the major problems in 
regulations is that there are multiple parties which publish regulations. For example 
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Local authorities, EU, BIS and EBA all release their own regulations. Regulators do not 
always communicate with each other, this creates more complications. It would be 
desirable that regulators communicate better with each other. Global regulators take 
money-laundering and terrorism regulations very seriously nowadays. Companies are 
strictly prohibited from involvement in money laundering or financing terrorists or 
criminals. That is, companies have to know their customers more specifically than 
before, which means more resources. Also, more regulations might increase the risk of 
accidently creating operations against regulations. 
 
The list above is formed from the answers of the interviewees in question 11. Answers have been putted 
in to the four-fielded matrix so that the bigger ellipse the more references it has received.  Also the 
location of an ellipse depends on which category it belongs most. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  What is, in your opinion, the single largest realized operational risk?  
 
 
 
1. Reputational damage 6. Chernobyl 
2. System implementations 7. Bankruptcies 2008 
3. Technical issue 8. Apathy to follow regulations 
4. Delays in payments 9. Money laundering 
5. Exxon Valdez 10. Terrorism regulations 
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The last four-field matrix has been formed from the question where interviewees 
discussed the biggest operational risks that have occurred in the world. The question did 
not specify “the biggest” in any particularly area. Reputational damage was the only 
risk that received more than one answer and it is located in the middle of the matrix as 
before. There are three single events that have created major catastrophic consequences. 
On 26 April 1986 a nuclear power plant started to burn and finally exploded in 
Chernobyl, Ukraine. The Chernobyl disaster was caused by multiple operational risks 
that occurred at the same time. There were failures of the systems; the processes weren’t 
followed correctly, employees were fatigued and made mistakes, and the regulations 
were not followed either. Failure in all four categories caused the world’s biggest 
nuclear power plant accident. The Exxon Valdez oil tanker disaster was the result of a 
fatigued employee, apathy in following regulations, poor processes and system failure. 
Both these disasters needed more than one realized operational risk to take place before 
the final push could happen. For example let’s image that the Chernobyl power plant 
needed 6 operational risks to occur in a row before meltdown. In addition, if we think, 
for example, that the average probability that one of the six risks occurs was 3 %. This 
means that the probability of meltdown was 0,03^6 = 0,000.000.000.729.  However 
today there could be 20 occurred operational risks before meltdown of a nuclear power 
plant. These kinds of disasters are always a sum of many improbable coincidences. 
Apathy following regulations was one of the main reasons for the bankruptcies in 2008 
and for that it has been located in the regulations and external risks field. 
 
Regulations have many purposes and one is to prevent disasters from happening. Others 
are to prevent money laundering and financing terrorist or criminals. Interviewees, 
when asked the biggest operational risks in the world, answered money laundering and 
terrorism regulations. Financial institutions must know their customers well enough so 
they do not operate with terrorists or criminals and they cannot be part of money 
laundering either. These two operational risks have been located in the field of 
regulations and external risks. Regulations forbid both actions but if a company fails to 
know their customer, they could finance terrorism without knowing it. It is the 
responsibility of financial companies not to be involved in anything like that. For 
insurance companies, money laundering brings more challenges because criminals favor 
insurance frauds. Regulations for insurance companies are tightening all the time, which 
brings even more challenges. The last three ellipses (2, 3, and 4) have been located in 
system. System implementations seem to have generated problems for multiple 
companies around Finland. Along with system implementations, technical issues have 
caused large operational risks in the financial sector and, as stated earlier, one reason for 
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this could be rapidly changing and developing information technology which companies 
are trying to keep up with. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.  Identification, calculation and prioritizing operational risks. 
 
Operational risk management is a very topical and developing area of risk management 
and therefore interviewees were asked about the resources that they have available for 
operational risk management. Interviewees reported how many people, how much time 
and money they have for operational risk management. The next figure gathers all the 
answers in a single table as a summary. 
 
Summarized answers to question: How many resources does your company have available for operational 
risks? 
	  
People Time Money 
-Usually one or two people 
responsible along with a small 
team 5-15 people.  
 
-In addition, operational risk 
management is happening 
alongside the daily work of  
all employees.. 
-Risk management working 
daily with operational risks. 
 
-In addition, few times per year 
going through and reporting all 
operational risks. 
-Money goes to the maintenance 
of processes, reporting system 
and its development. 
 
-Exact amount of money spent 
on operational risk management 
is difficult to determine because 
of the broadness of operational 
risk management. 
 
-Large and developing area and 
there for more resources spend. 
 
Figure 16.  Operational risk resources. 
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Every company has at least one full-time risk manager responsible for operational risk 
management. Along with the risk manager there are 5-15 people in the risk management 
function. Usually this risk management function deals with other risks not only 
operational risks. A risk management function for operational risks only is still quite 
rare. However, the supervision of operational risks has been delegated to a wide range 
of different business functions and every employee is responsible to report realized 
operational risks to risk management. 
 
The time that insurance companies use to manage operational risks is limited. Risk 
management works daily with operational risks, but they deal with other risks also. In 
addition, there are meetings a few times per year where risk management gathers all 
operational risk data. Risk management analyses this data and produce a report where 
the biggest operational risks are brought to the attention of the board of directors, who 
then make a decision on the basis of the report. Interviewees were not able to give a 
precise number for the money spent on operational risk management, not because it is 
confidential information but because the exact amount is difficult to determine due to 
the broadness of operational risk management. Operational risk management usually 
uses money for maintenance of processes, reporting, systems and their development. 
The next figure focuses on how insurance companies identify, calculate and prioritize 
operational risks in general. 
 
Summarized answers of question: What kind of tools your company uses in following categories: a) 
identifying b) calculation c) prioritizing of operational risks. 
 
 
Identification Calculation Prioritizing 
-Realized operational 
risks are reported in the 
system. 
 
-Every function defines 
operational risks. Yearly 
risk mapping/reports. 
-Calculation is still rather difficult, 
which is why insurance companies 
rarely use special formulas for 
operational risks à no Euros per 
risk.  
 
-Some define operational risks 
probability and effect from one to 
five scales. Reserves. Capital 
adequacy 01.01.2016 
-Person responsible raises a few 
important risks up and prioritization is 
done in the board of directors with 
recommendations from risk managers.  
 
-Usually only biggest decisions go to 
board of directors.  
 
Figure 17.  Operational risk tools 
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Finnish insurance companies have begun to collect historical data from realized 
operational risks. With historical data they can prepare better for operational risks in the 
future. Interviewees said that they use the system to report all realized operational risks. 
Every function is responsible for reporting their own realized operational risks in the 
system. Operational risk management then organizes yearly mapping where they raise 
the most important risks with the board of directors. Some insurance companies monitor 
key risk indicators through the year which gives them the ability to improve reaction 
time. Although gathering operational risk data has shown even large improvements, 
calculations from this data are still rather difficult so companies rarely use any 
calculation methods to support operational risk management.  
 
 
Likelihood 
  
Consequences 
  
 
Insignificant 
(<1tEUR) 
Minor (1-
10tEUR) 
Moderate (10-
100tEUR) 
Major (100t-
1mnEUR) 
Catastrophic 
(>1mnEUR) 
Very Likely 
(>30%) 
High High Extreme Extreme Extreme 
Likely (10-
30%) 
Moderate High High Extreme Extreme 
Moderate 
(5-10%) 
Low Moderate High Extreme Extreme 
Unlikely (1-
5%) 
Low Low Moderate High Extreme 
Rare (<1%) 
Low Low Moderate High High 
Figure 18. Likelihood and Consequences matrix 
 
New regulations from Solvency 2 might oblige insurance companies to calculate certain 
operational risks and, because of this, some Finnish insurance companies are already 
using standard models to support operational risk management. Some companies scale 
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operational risks on the basis of probability and impact. This model gives values to the 
probability and impact of certain operational risks. Usually probability and impact have 
been rated on a scale of one to five so that one is low probability/impact and five is high 
probability/impact. These numbers are multiplied by each other and the final effects 
captured. The figure above should clarify how the model works. 
 
Companies use this model to prioritize their operational risks. Risks that have a value of 
25 are the most important risks and companies should focus on managing those risks. 
However, the biggest risks that need large changes or actions are usually raised with the 
board of directors. The board of directors then makes decisions with recommendations 
from operational risk managers. Risk managers prioritize smaller risks after they have 
analysed operational risks data that the company has collected. 
 
Both tools and resources are linked substantially to the regulations of operational risks. 
That is, regulators might give new tools to manage operational risks and new tools to 
measure operational risks. Regulators will also create new regulations that might induce 
requirements, which lead to more resources spent. Interviewees mentioned often that 
new regulations could create more costs. This is because regulators might require that 
companies have to know their customers better, companies have to collect more 
operational risk data or companies just have to follow regulators very closely so that 
there will be no surprises. The sixth question for external interviewees was: Do the 
regulations of operational risks have an effect on your business? How? The next figure 
will present a summary of the answers categorized in four main regulators: Basel 2/3, 
Solvency 2, Finnish law/regulators (FIVA) and EU law/regulators.
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Basel 2 Solvency 2 
-Gave a lot of standards and methods to 
operational risk management, which later 
"spilled" on the entire financial sector, 
although Basel 2 is for banking sector only. 
 
-Regulations do not make it more difficult, 
although it is difficult to keep up with 
changes. 
-Will not concern mutual pension 
insurance companies (MPIC), but Solvency 
2 includes a lot of things which are 
reasonable and which connect to reliable 
corporate governance. 
 
-Solvency 2 has been under monitoring a 
long time. 
Finnish law/regulation EU law/regulations 
-Legislation for mutual pension insurance 
companies is currently being renewed.  
 
-Attention towards operational risks is, 
however, growing all the time. In Finland 
such an intermediate step where the 
Financial Supervisory Authority (FIVA) 
demands an annual report for losses comes 
before Solvency 2. Might create problems 
if collected data is not valid. 
-Implementation of operational risk 
regulation from EU to systems is 
operational risk. 
 
-Regulations may be surprises and reaction 
time might be short. This requires a lot of 
active monitoring, rapid actions and 
resources. 
Figure 19. Regulations 
 
 
The job of the regulators is to give standards and methods to companies so that they 
could offer investors and customers reliable and stable services. Regulators also want to 
increase companies’ transparency in order to earn the trust of investors and customers. 
A high-level regulatory framework makes it easier for running errands, giving 
continuity and knowledge. As we can see from the figure above, there are multiple 
regulators that have an impact on insurance companies in Finland. According to 
interviewees, the hardest part is to follow the development of regulations and what 
makes it even harder is that there are many regulatory entities. One problem is that these 
entities do not always communicate with each other so there might emerge conflict 
between different regulations. This is one reason why insurance companies have to 
follow every regulator closely. Companies wish that regulators would communicate 
better with each other so that the coordination between them would be improved.  
 
Interviewees mentioned that regulations do not make operational risk management more 
difficult, but new regulations might affect resources spent on operational risk 
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management. Some of the insurance companies in Finland have included regulatory 
guidelines from the beginning and that is why there should be no surprises in the future. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of operational risk regulation from the EU in systems 
is an operational risk. Regulations may still be surprises and reaction time might be 
short. This requires a lot of active monitoring, rapid actions and resources. Although 
Basel 2 regulations are for banks it also concerns insurance companies in Finland.  The 
Financial Supervisory Authority (FIVA) has taken operational risk management areas 
under their standards therefore insurance companies are under some regulations from 
Basel 2. Solvency 2 is a similar regulatory authority to Basel 2 but it is for insurance 
companies and not as developed as Basel 2. Solvency 2 will not concern mutual pension 
insurance companies (MPIC) but will include a lot of reasonable issues connected to 
reliable corporate governance. In addition, the capital adequacy reform will be different 
to MPIC’s due to the fact that dividends are not paid. The capital adequacy reform is 
going to Finnish parliament in 2015. While a lot of work has been done with Solvency 
2, it is still mostly monitoring insurance companies. Solvency 2 is a rather smaller 
regulator compared to Basel 2 & 3.  
 
As stated earlier, legislation for MPIC’s is currently being renewed, possibly resulting 
in demands for operational risk management. However, demands should not have an 
impact on daily processes, but attention towards operational risks is growing all the 
time. Non-life insurance companies will receive new regulations and guidelines in 
2015-2016, which include reporting and classification methods at least. In Finland, an 
intermediate step where FIVA demands the annual report of losses comes before 
Solvency 2. This might create problems if collected data is not valid. However, 
insurance companies in Finland seem to have collected data sufficiently so far. 
Regulators may demand technological development as well and that is one reason that 
interviewees were asked about technological development. Technological development 
is not only a technological issue, but also a matter of opinion because of everyone’s 
online activity. People’s actions have been taken into account when renewing 
information technology. Companies have to inform customers continuously, but in the 
end companies cannot be responsible for every click that customer execute. Let’s create 
an example of harmful customer online action. The Internet is full of phishing messages 
which should be ignored immediately. Nevertheless, there is always somebody that 
accidently gives his/her personal information to thieves. The only action that a company 
could do against this kind of fraud is to inform customers but after this it is the 
responsible of the customer to notice if someone is trying to get his/her personal 
information. The ninth question asked was: How great a risk/threat is the development 
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of technology and your company’s constantly growing dependence on it? Figure X 
below presents the answers. There are three ellipses, which are opportunities, risks and 
actions. Many of the interviewees think that technological development is a 
combination of opportunities and risks. They also suggested some actions, which could 
be taken to decrease the risks that technological development creates. 
 
Interviewees believe that technological development removes certain risks such as typos 
and other kinds of risks caused by human error. In this respect more controls could be 
installed to facilitate supervision. In addition, data collection becomes easier because 
data becomes more centralized. On the other hand, centralized data pose a more severe 
hacking risk. Interviewees all agreed that dependence on the technology is huge and 
will not decrease in the future. Interviewees also brought up the point that technological 
development could cause new kind of risks that are still unknown. Technological 
development is a business risk that creates operational risks. If a company does not keep 
up with technological development it cannot provide customers with proper digital 
services, which may lead to customer losses. Keeping up with technological 
development is actually a mandatory requirement in the current, competitive, economic 
environment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Risks, actions and opportunities 
 
 
Opportunities -­‐	  Removes	  certain	  risks -­‐	  Centralized	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  to	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Actions 
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  up	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  Still	  unknown	  risks -­‐	  Hacking	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What actions then could be done to manage these risks? As I have said before, 
companies have to keep up with development in order to maintain competitive force. To 
do this, companies have to make sure that technology is updated as often as necessary. 
When updating the system it is very important to run enough tests so that incomplete 
changes do not go online too early. Also backup systems and processes have to be in 
shape. If there is, for example, a black out, management has to make sure that there are 
no major interruptions in functions. In addition, there have to be processes for this kind 
of situations. Both backup systems and processes are strongly related to continuity 
planning. Operations of the main functions have to be ensured even in exceptional 
circumstances. System crashes should not cause a long period of malfunction. 
Continuity planning also involves contracts with business partners. Some contracts are 
vital to companies so contracts should be longer than one or two years. Companies have 
to develop and monitor technology continuously, which is why they have to pay 
attention to it in now and in the future.  
 
The next figure will show the answers to the question about operational risks in the past, 
present and future. Operational risks that received two or more answers are presented in 
the figure below. Four out of five interviewees raised reputational risks when asked 
about past realized operational risks. Reputational risks include all kinds of events that 
have caused reputational damages, such as fines or customer service malfunction. Fines 
and customer service malfunction might cause negative publicity which can cause 
customer and financial losses. Needless to say, insurance companies do not want 
negative publicity and that why they need a good relationship with the media. In 
Finland the best way to earn confidence is through transparency.  MPIC’s in particular, 
are under the supervision of Finnish people and media because they control the pension 
funds of Finnish people. One problem with the media is that they do not always 
investigate thoroughly before releasing news. For example, a couple years ago a 
reputable newspaper released news including accusations against one insurance 
company. Although this news was not true, the insurance company had to prove it to the 
people. Investigations caused costs to the company although the accusations were 
incorrect.  
 
Reputational damage was also raised in present operational risks, which is not a surprise 
because insurance companies are continuously under the influence of reputational risks. 
The biggest difference between past operational risks and present operational risks were 
regulations. Regulations were hardly mentioned in past operational risks, on the other 
hand regulations were the most mentioned topic in present operational risks. Overall 
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regulations were mentioned four times, money laundering 2 times, financing terrorism 2 
times and following regulatory changes 2 times. Regulations are clearly a large part of 
operational risk management in today’s insurance companies. Regulators might demand 
different reports and different methods than companies are now using. That would cause 
more costs. Regulators have also tightened regulations for insurance companies 
concerning financing terrorism and money laundering. Insurance companies have to 
know their customers better so that they do not accidently, or intentionally, participate 
in money laundering or financing terrorism. Regulations about knowing your customers 
and other regulatory changes require more resources from companies. Regulatory 
demands create compliance risk as well, which is a large operational risk for insurance 
companies. 
 
 
Would you mention the order of five or more biggest/most important operational risks regarding your 
company in the following categories: a) Already realized operational risks b) Currently faced operational 
risks c) Possible operational risks emerging in the future (numbers next to operational risk is the number 
of how many times a particular risk was mentioned by the interviewees) 
 
Table 7. Past, present and future operational risks 
 
 
Past   
Reputational damage 4 
Negative publicity 3 
Media 3 
System crashes 3 
It outsourcing 2 
Fines 2 
Present   
Regulations 4 
Knowing your customer -->Money laundering 2 
Financing terrorist 2 
Changes in regulations 2 
Reputational damage 2 
Cyber security 2 
System implementation 2 
Future   
Securing sensitive information 3 
Vulnerability of the information environment 2 
Regulations 2 
Cyber risks 2 
Risks that haven't occurred yet (emerging risks) 2 
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Two interviewees said that cyber security is one of the present operational risks for their 
company. This is related to compliance risks because companies might get fines if 
customer data is abused. This means that companies have to ensure that sensitive 
customer data will remain confidential and confidentiality is essential to insurance 
companies. Securing sensitive information is also a future operational risk that 
concerned interviewees. Furthermore, the vulnerability of the information environment 
is one of the future operational risks according to interviewees. Hacking of sensitive 
information has increased in the recent past and it could spread to insurance companies 
in the same way it has spread to the banking sector. There were also mentions of some 
operational risks that have not occurred yet. For example if radiation from mobile 
phones was found to be harmful to health, it could cause major losses to insurance 
companies. Insurance companies would have to pay a lot of compensations and finally 
reprise their products.  
 
 
Would you mention some operational risks, which can be devastating in the future? 
 
 
SYSTEM   PROCESSES 	  	  
Cyber risks Information 
technology 
Continuity Working	  in	  
exceptional	  
circumstances	  
    	  	   	  	  
PEOPLE   EXTERNAL RISKS   
Communication 
between IT and 
management 
 Climate	  change	   Cyber risks 
Modelling errors   Hacking Inventions	  
Human risk (Staff 
shortage) 
  Unexpected	  major	  cause	  of	  
sickness	  (asbestos)	  
Pandemic	  
    Recognition	  of	  the	  existence	  
of	  the	  field	  
	  	  
Figure 21. Devastating operational risks 
 
 
Interviewees were also asked about operational risks that might be devastating in the 
future, not to their company but in general. In the figure below there are four already 
familiar categories in which the answers have been located. Cyber risks are the only 
operational risks that have located in two categories, system and regulations and 
external risks. This is because cyber risks can be external or internal risks and the 
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functionality as well as protection of the system affects the likelihood and impact of 
cyber risks. Every other category possesses the same operational risks that have been 
mentioned before in this study but regulations have been omitted from the answers. This 
might be due to the fact that insurance companies do not see regulations or regulatory 
changes as an operational risk that could be devastating to a company. Nevertheless, 
above we can see operational risks that might cause trouble for insurance companies in 
the future. 
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7. INTERPRETATION OF INFORMATION FROM CASE STUDY 
 
Now that we have gone through internal and external questionnaires it is time to focus 
on differences and similarities of the answers. As you may have already noticed that 
there were mutual understandings between internal and external interviewees as well as 
there were disagreements. Previous literature concluded that operational risk 
management is rather new and rising risk category. This announcement was surely 
accepted among the interviewees. Companies have become to spend more resources to 
operational risk management, which indicate that companies have begun to slowly 
appreciate more operational risk management in the last decade. Companies have 
understood that they have to manage not only credit and market risks but also 
operational risks. In addition the regulators have paid more attention to operational risks 
as well, which is one reason that companies have to reallocate resources to operational 
risk management. Information for this chapter is mainly collected from the 
interpretation from questionnaires. This chapter will give good references to further 
studies. 
 
Chapter 8.1 provides a summary of the answers from the questionnaires. Chapter 8.1 
will also provide main differences and similarities between internal and external 
questionnaire. Chapter 8.2 answers to the research questions. The key operational risks 
and most common tools used in Finnish insurance companies will be presented on the 
base of the answers of the interviewees. In addition how insurance companies in 
Finland prioritize their resources to operational risk management. 
 
7.1 Replies of the Questionnaires, Main Findings 
 
Both internal and external interviewees named numerous system-elated operational 
risks that have occurred in companies around the world. This tells us that financial 
companies have faced system-related operational risks and those realized risks have 
caused enough losses that they have become public. The biggest differences were in 
operational risks caused by people as well as regulations and external events. External 
interviewees mentioned more operational risks that were caused by human error or 
other human actions. However, this does not tell us much because these answers were 
about operational risks from companies around the world and, as mentioned before, 
external interviewees work daily with operational risks and therefore can be expected to 
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observe operational risks more specifically. Operational risks mentioned by external 
interviewees might be closer to financial companies and, it can be also seen from the 
answers, on this basis, financial companies faces more operational risks caused by 
people, and regulations and external events, than other operational risks. However, the 
second four-field matrices tell us more about operational risks that Finnish insurance 
companies are facing today, which is more important regarding this study. 
 
The second matrices are much more interesting because they deal with operational risks 
from interviewees’ own companies. It can be said that they posses some of the key 
operational risks which occur in Finnish insurance companies. Firstly, both internal and 
external interviewees were able to mention much more single operational risks when 
asked about their own company. The main operational risks in Company X seem to 
focus on system and people, when other Finnish insurance companies clearly added 
regulations. However, interviewees’ positions in the organization have to be taken into 
consideration. Operational risks seem to be different depending on the employee’s 
position. For example, a claims associate who is processing customer compensation 
cannot work for an hour because the system is down. This can be very frustrating and it 
will slow down processing. In contrast, an operational risk manager does not consider 
that this kind of system malfunction is very serious because the operational risk 
manager considers the matter on a large scale. Losses from this kind of situation are 
usually minimal and hardly calculable, which is why operational risk managers are not 
necessary interested in it. Of course, if system malfunction is a daily problem, the risk 
manager should be interested in it. Nevertheless, external and internal interviewees 
stress the importance of system-related operational risks, which means that regardless of 
the position of the employee, systems is one of the biggest sources of operational risks. 
Particularly system-related problems which are visible to customers, because it causes 
reputational damage as well. 
 
Information security failures are an operational risk which might create reputational 
damage along with financial losses. If sensitive customer information is accidently 
released to the general public, it could cause fines and other financial losses as well as 
reputational damage. Information security and failed data protection are both very often 
mentioned operational risks. The insurance business is very dependent on trust. Who 
would take insurance from an insurance company that cannot keep sensitive data safe. 
For this reason insurance companies take trustworthiness very seriously, another reason 
would be regulations. 
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Internal and external answers differ significantly in terms of regulations. In fact, internal 
interviewees did not mention any regulatory operational risks regarding Company X, 
whereas external interviewees raised multiple regulatory risks regarding their 
companies. The difference might be due to the position of the employees, however it is 
not the only explanation. The timing of the interviews is crucial, although interviewees 
received the questionnaire in advance. System-related operational risks were topical in 
Company X in the summer of 2014, clearly reflected in the answers, but this does not 
explain the difference either. It could be because only operational risk managers deal 
with regulatory operational risks or because Company X does not deal with regulations 
on a local level as much as other insurance companies in Finland. This might be due to 
fact that Company X has centralized operational risk management in one or two offices. 
In this case, “centralized” mean that offices around Europe do not have their own 
operational risks manager. This has been a business decision in where regulatory know-
how might remain at the local level, excluding senior management, so regulatory risks 
are not part of daily processes in Company X. For example, the team that works with 
Solvency 2 is centralized in London. Regulations and regulatory supervision is a 
growing area, which is why it would be important to share information regularly on a 
local level as well. 
 
However, if we look at the matrices in chapter 7 we can see that employees from other 
Finnish insurance companies talked a lot about regulatory operational risks. Money 
laundering, financing terrorism or statutory customers are already covered by 
regulations, and all of these create operational risks. Regulators demand that insurance 
companies do not participate in any criminal activity and that is why there are 
regulations that require better awareness of insurance companies’ customers. 
Regulations that prevent criminal activity are very important, but they also create more 
costs for insurance companies. Again, if a company accidently takes part in, for 
example money laundering, it could be fined by the regulator. For MPIC there are 
statutory customers, meaning that Finnish law demands that MPIC’s cannot choose 
their customers. Statutory customers are part of the regulations from Finnish authorities 
and might cause operational risks for Mutual Pension Insurance Companies. The 
influence of regulations on Finnish insurance companies could need further research. 
 
Operational risks caused by humans have been noticed similarly in both matrices. 
Human error is the most common operational risk, which is hard to control completely. 
People can make a lot of different mistakes and every insurance company has to accept 
this. Of course, there must be controls, which expose mistakes before they cause 
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irreversible damage. Nevertheless, controls must be reasonable designed and carefully 
thought through so that they do not essentially complicate tasks. Setting controls is 
therefore balancing between reasonable and overbearing controls. Overbearing controls 
slow down operations so much that it is not wise to use them. A large number of 
controls might also be a motion of censure for employees, which clearly does not 
improve employees’ motivation. Insurance companies should therefore go through the 
controls more regularly. Controls are a large part of the technological facilities which 
play a crucial role in people’s work today. Technological development can make 
employees’ tasks more difficult by changing all the time. 
 
Employees in Finnish insurance companies think that technological development is an 
operational risk, but an opportunity as well. The biggest concern is that if a company 
does not keep up with technological development, it could cause major problems. The 
whole communication system is changing and companies have to be able to provide 
services in quickly updating channels. This means that if a company cannot keep up 
with development it has no future or, at least the future does not look very bright. 
Companies have to be able to provide services with different channels of distribution. If 
we do not provide these service channels someone else will and take our customers as 
well. Both internal and external interviewees were also concerned about hacking risks. 
Hackers have not been generally interested in insurance companies because there is not 
the same kind of money transferring as in banks, but when insurance companies 
centralize their sensitive data it could start to interest hackers. It is hard to say how 
criminals could use insurance companies’ sensitive data in the future but insurance 
companies should pay attention to possible hacking problems brought about by 
technological development. Overall, the dependence is huge and it will not decrease, 
which is why insurance companies will have to spend substantial amounts of resources 
on the system in the future as well. 
 
On the contrary, technological development removes certain kind of operational risks 
like typos and other human risks. More advanced technology might provide more 
support controls, reducing the number of mistakes. Growing automation will also help 
to minimize operational risks caused by human activity. Technological development 
also makes it easier to collect and edit data removing operational risks as well. The 
answers of the interviewees do not significantly differ here either. Everybody seems to 
agree that technological development is mandatory and companies should use the 
opportunities that it creates and be ready for the new operational risks that technological 
development entails. 
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Internal interviewees said that system-related operational risks were the most serious 
operational risks from the past. Again, Company X suffered minor system failures in 
the summer of 2014 therefore the system is raised when dealing with past operational 
risks. By contrast, external interviewees said that reputational damage had been the 
most serious past operational risk along with negative publicity. Insurance companies 
seem to be concerned about their reputation more than Company X. It could also be that 
because Company X is rather unfamiliar to Finland the media is not interested in 
Company X as much as in other Finnish insurance companies.  MPIC in particular are 
under the scrutiny of the Finnish media and general public because of MPIC’s role in 
the Finnish economy. 
 
Systems were the main subject among the external interviewees regarding present 
operational risks as well, but external interviewees mentioned regulations as their 
present operational risks. Money laundering and financing terrorism are regulatory 
operational risks for today’s insurance companies. Also changes in regulations can be 
segmented into operational risks. System failures on the other hand seem to be the main 
operational risks for Company X. There are significant differences in the past and 
present operational risks between Company X and other Finnish insurance companies, 
which could be due to differences in organizational structure. Research into the impact 
of organizational structure on operational risks in Finnish insurance companies is 
limited and could need further research. 
 
System-related operational risks, such as securing sensitive information, will be a large 
part of operational risk management in Finnish insurance companies in the future due to 
the development of information technology. Insurance companies have to be able to 
react quickly to information technology development. In addition, regulations like 
legislative or political reforms could have a major impact on operational risk 
management in Finnish insurance companies in the future. All interviewees agreed on 
what could be operational risks affecting Finnish insurance companies in the future. 
Legislative and political reforms require companies to follow closely the development 
of the reforms. In addition, companies have to invest in relationships with regulators 
and other entities that might make changes to legislation. Cyber risks overall are a 
concern for Finnish insurance companies in the future. Cyber risks are dangerous 
because their severity or scope is still little known, making them unpredictable and 
difficult to prepare for. 
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How can Finnish insurance companies then prepare for operational risks? Monitoring 
and reporting realized operational risks are the most important part of the identification 
of operational risk that a company have. Every function defines their operational risks 
in a system. Operational risk management then maps the risks in a yearly report usually 
presented to senior management. Companies do not necessary have a particular system 
for operational risks, some uses excel and some have a modified risk management tool 
for operational risks. Company X uses the BWise risk management system for 
operational risk management as well as for other risks.  
 
 
Figure 22. Likelihood and Consequences matrix 
 
These reports that companies make are used to prioritize resources for operational risks. 
Companies have a person who is responsible for operational risks. This person usually 
raises a few important operational risks and prioritizing is done by the board of 
directors, with recommendations from risk managers. However, every function has 
powers of action, which means that they can make small decisions relating to small 
operational risk and usually only the biggest decisions go to the board of directors. 
Operational risk management is the only function which collects operational risks from 
other functions together in one report. Finnish insurance companies do not use 
calculations for operational risks as they use calculations for credit and market risk 
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because calculating operational risks is still rather difficult and special formulas for 
operational risks are rarely used. Insurance companies do not usually value Euros per 
risk in Finland. Some companies define operational risks with probability and effect 
using scales of one to five. This scale helps insurance companies to differentiate 
important operational risks from less important ones. This is a widely used tool to 
prioritize operational risks in Finnish insurance companies. 
 
7.2 Answers to the Research Questions  
 
This chapter answers the research questions. The key operational risks and most 
common tools used in Finnish insurance companies and Company X will be presented 
on the base of the answers of the interviewees. In addition, I will present how insurance 
companies in Finland prioritize their resources for operational risk management. 
Operational risk management differs slightly between Company X and other Finnish 
insurance companies as has been explained above. Despite these differences, they seem 
to manage operational risks quite similarly. Key operational risks in Company X and in 
other Finnish insurance companies can be put into four main categories. These 
categories are systems, human risks, technological development and regulations. 
 
7.2.1 Key operational risks 
 
System-related operational risks seem to be an issue for every insurance company in 
Finland, which is why companies might want to reallocate their resources. The function 
of the system is very important to an insurance company from the perspective of the 
management, employees and customers. It is hard to manage a company if the system 
does not work. In addition, employees get fatigued and tired if the system does not work 
and eventually some employees might leave the company. Of course if news of the 
system malfunction leaks to customers it causes reputational damage. This is why 
companies should take system malfunctions very seriously. Company X has taken steps 
to fix system weaknesses, which is good, but sometimes it would be better to look at the 
situation more holistically, not just repair minor errors. 
 
Human risks are more low or moderate risks if we look at the likelihood/consequences 
table, but they occur more frequently and that is why companies should pay attention to 
them also. By reviewing controls and identifying the lack of controls they could reduce 
human mistakes. Internal fraud is very rare in Finnish insurance companies. Internal 
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fraud is currently prevented by controls so that potential opportunities for abuse are at a 
low level. Trust between employers and employees is at a good level, which is why no 
special controls are required. Actually Company X could review controls with a view to 
removing unnecessary and obstructive controls. Nevertheless, human risks are daily 
operational risks manageable with controls and good communication. Companies can 
always improve internal communication, for example by aligning different functions, 
which might reduce unnecessary communication. Better communication is an essential 
part of human risk management. In addition, technological development can help to 
reduce human risks. 
 
Technological development can be mentioned as one of the key operational risks in 
Finnish insurance companies. Technological development and dependence is an 
opportunity and a threat to an insurance company. If a company does not keep up with 
technological development it cannot provide customers with proper digital services, this 
may incur customer losses. Keeping up with technological development is actually a 
mandatory requirement in the current, competitive, economic environment. An 
insurance company has to take technological development very seriously if it wants to 
succeed against the ever-increasing competition. Technological development exposes a 
firm to more fatal system failures therefore management has to pay serious attention to 
it. Technological development can also expose insurance companies to new cyber risks 
such as hacking or sensitive customer data abuse. Securing sensitive data is very 
important and developing information technology can make the information 
environment more vulnerable.  
 
The fourth key operational risk would be regulations. Continually strengthening the role 
of the regulators creates more work for insurance companies. Insurance companies have 
to follow regulators so that new regulations do not come as surprises. Regulations like 
legislative reforms might cause changes to processes, which is why it is important to 
know about regulatory changes in advance. Already existing regulations, like financing 
terrorism and money laundering, cause additional work for insurance companies. If 
companies do not comply with regulations it may result in substantial fines. Regulations 
do not exist simply to annoy companies, a high-level regulatory framework makes it 
easier, providing continuity and knowledge as well. All of the four key operational risks 
which occur in Finnish insurance companies would benefit from more specific research. 
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7.2.2 Most common tools 
 
Finnish insurance companies all use rather difference tools for operational risk 
management. This is because operational risk management has not yet found the most 
functional model. Operational risk management is still quite young, which is why 
different tools or models are still competing with each other. However there are some 
similarities between the tools that insurance companies use in Finland. here is a clear 
tendency is to give probability and consequences rates to operational risks. This is how 
companies specify operational risks, providing better knowledge when prioritizing 
operational risks. The likelihood and consequences table introduced earlier in this study 
is a simple version of a tool that has been used in operational risk management. 
 
Nevertheless, tools that Finnish insurance companies use remain fairly simple. Some 
use excel to record operational risks, some have more advanced tools, Company X for 
example uses the BWise system for operational risks recording. Currently, insurance 
companies monitor, make reports and try to control operational risks that have been 
found. In addition, Finnish insurance companies do not actually use any relevant tools 
to calculate operational risks. Insurance companies do not measure operational risks as 
they measure credit and market risks. This might be one subdivision which might need 
more attention from risk management in Finnish insurance companies.  The simple level 
of operational risk management tools is perhaps due to the fact that operational risks are 
a relatively new risk category in the insurance business in Finland. By contrast, banks 
use much more advanced operational risks management tools. Could these tools be used 
for the insurance business as well?  
 
7.2.3 How to prioritize resources to operational risks 
 
How do insurance companies then prioritize resources for operational risks using the 
tools that they have? The first action that companies take is to look at the watch list of 
operational risks. Risk management then rates the operational risks that appear on the 
list using, for example, the probability x consequences method. This is how operational 
risk management knows which operational risks are the most important and which ones 
are less important. After rating them, operational risk management analyse what kind of 
actions certain operational risks need and should they report to senior management or 
can they execute actions by themselves. Minor operational risks can be usually be 
remedied by the business section that is under the influence of the operational risk. On 
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the other hand, if the detected operational risk is larger and needs structural changes to 
fix, the operational risk manager informs senior management. Senior management then 
make the decision. It usually happens once or twice per year that the operational risks 
manager informs senior management about operational risks. However, if the risk is 
severe and company should immediately react, then senior management usually 
participates quicker.  
 
Insurance companies in Finland do not have many different ways or methods for 
prioritizing operational risks. The simple way that they use is to give values to 
operational risks for its likelihood and impact. The evaluation of likelihood and impact 
is based on feelings and experience. This is not a sufficient way to evaluate the 
likelihood and impact of operational risks. However, there are no formulas or methods 
which would be unambiguously better for prioritizing operational risks, with the 
exception of the AMA model used by the world’s largest banks. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS  
 
This research opens up new research directions for operational risk management within 
what companies can explore in order to improve performance. This study shows that 
there are four main operational risks that concern insurance companies in Finland. 
These operational risks are systems, human risks, technological development and 
regulations. System-related operational risks especially seem to cause problems for 
insurance companies in Finland. Companies know that system-related operational risks 
create costs but have no further details. Thus, companies such as Company X should 
pay more attention to details that create system-related operational risks. In order to do 
so, they should improve communication channels between IT and operations, examine 
controls in order to improve response speed and arrange the processes to support the 
system more systematically. System-related operational risks are distinctly internal 
operational risks unlike technological development, but these two are essentially 
connected to each other. Technological development is inevitable for insurance 
companies that want to stay in the globally competitive. Customers demand faster and 
easier channels to communicate with companies. Sending letters is old hat. However, 
investing in technological development is very expensive and long term. Sometimes it 
is still a better choice to acquire a new system than repair the old one. These are 
decisions that senior management should bring up regularly. Although technological 
development can be a business risk it also creates numerous operational risks as well, 
which means that operational risk management should take part in decisions concerning 
technological development.  
 
In addition, human risks and regulatory risks are key operational risks for insurance 
companies in Finland and for Company X. Even though they are not as topical as 
system-related operational risks or technological development they are still a very 
important part of operational risk management. In fact, regulatory risks will increase in 
the future therefore insurance companies should prepare for them as well as they can. It 
could facilitate the operative sector in the future when new regulatory demand may 
appear. Regulatory violations have caused major damage to banking sector, this should 
serve as a warning to insurance companies. It has been said that solvency 2 will update 
regulations for insurance companies in the near future.  This study shows that insurance 
companies could prepare better for regulatory operational risks. How they could prepare 
better should be researched in another study. However, Company X could concentrate 
more specifically on a local level when dealing with regulatory operational risks. 
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Operational risks caused by people can be found in all insurance companies in Finland. 
In particular, communication and dependence on an individual employee are the most 
important operational risks that people incur. Company X should focus on and improve 
communication channels so that there would be no damaging misunderstandings.  They 
should also hold on to key employees to make the continuous of the company more 
secure. 
 
Quantitative calculations for operational risks are still quite rare in Finnish insurance 
companies, which indicate that insurance companies are in the early stage of 
development when dealing with operational risks. Insurance companies could try to take 
inspiration from the banking sector, which uses more advanced quantitative methods for 
operational risks such as AMA. However, the most common tool that Finnish insurance 
companies use is a likelihood and consequences matrix. This matrix is quite simple yet 
functional. The matrix tells a company which operational risks are worth the effort and 
which are not. By improving this tool, insurance companies could obtain more useful 
information about operational risks and then be more prepared. Nevertheless, it could 
need more specific research in order to make it more useful.  
 
Finnish insurance companies prioritize their limited resources for operational risks by 
giving values to different operational risks. By giving these values, operational risk 
management map the importance of the operational risks and then prioritize resources 
for the most important. Values can be given with a likelihood and consequences matrix 
or with some other similar method. However methods that are used are quite simple 
therefore the allocation of the resources does not always go perfectly. These methods 
need more study so that insurance companies could be more precise when allocating 
resources. For now, the values are based on historical knowledge or even a belief. It 
should be more quantitative and specific.  
 
At the end it is important to assert that operational risk management is a vital part of the 
companies’ short and long-term success. Insurance companies in Finland should take 
operational risk more seriously in order to avoid any unpleasant surprises. However this 
study just scratches the surface of operational risk management; further research would 
certainly help to develop a framework for managing these risks in the insurance 
industry.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Operative risks: General questionnaire 
 
1. Is the term operational risk familiar? (yes/no) 
2. Would you mention few realized operational risk that has occurred in Finland or 
worldwide? 
3. What kind of daily operational risks your company face? 
4. What kind of tools your company use in: 
 a) Identification of operational risks, 
 b) Calculation of operational risks, 
 c) Prioritize of operational risks? 
5. How much resources you have available for operational risk management? 
(Employees, money, time) 
6. Do the regulations of operational risks (e.g. Solvency 2, Basel 3) have an affect to 
your business? How? 
7. Would you mention the order of five or more biggest/most important operational risk 
regarding your company in the following categories? 
 a) Already realized operational risks 
 b) Now faced operational risks 
 c) Possible operational risks emerging in future 
8. Are the processes of your company part of the operational risk management? 
9. How great risk/threat is the development of the technology and its constantly growing 
dependence to your company? 
10. Is the lack of controls caused operational risks to your company? 
11. What is in your opinion the single largest realized operational risk? And how do you 
think it could have been prevented? (You can also mention the more than one). 
12. Would you mention some operational risks, which can be devastating in the future? 
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Operatiiviset riskit: Sisäinen kyselylomake 
 
1. Onko teille tuttu termi operatiivinen riski?(kyllä/ei) 
2. Mainitse muutama maailmalla tai Suomessa toteutunut operatiivinen riski. 
3. Minkälaisia päivittäisiä operatiivisia riskejä teidän mielestänne yrityksemme kohtaa? 
4. Kuinka suurena riskinä näet teknologian kehityksen ja sen aiheuttaman yhä 
suuremman riippuvuuden yrityksellemme?  
5. Minkälaisia työkaluja meillä on käytössä: 
 a) operatiivisten riskien kartoittamisessa, 
 b) operatiivisten riskien laskennassa, 
 c) operatiivisten riskien priorisoinnissa? 
6. Miten nämä työkalut eroaa aiemmista työpaikoistanne? 
7. Mainitse järjestyksessä neljä(tai enemmän) tärkeintä/suurinta operatiivista riskiä 
koskien yritystä X  seuraavista kategorioista: 
 a) jo toteutuneita operatiivisia riskejä 
 b) tällä hetkellä tuoreita/pinnalla olevia operatiivisia riskejä 
 c) mahdollisesti tulevaisuudessa ilmeneviä operatiivisia riskejä 
8. Miten mielestäsi toteutuneisiin ja pinnalla oleviin riskeihin olisi voitu valmistautua 
paremmin? Miten ne olisi voitu välttää? 
9. Kuinka suurena operatiivisena riskinä näet väärinmyydyistä tuotteista aiheutuneet 
kustannukset? Millä toimenpiteillä pienentäisit niistä aiheutuvia riskejä/kuluja? 
10. Miten operatiiviset riskit eroavat yrityksestä X ja yrityksessä/yrityksissä missä 
työskentelitte ennen? 
11. Osaisitko mainita joitain tulevia operatiivisia riskejä, joihin ei välttämättä osata 
vielä varautua? 
 
* Tuleeko teille vielä mieleen muuta mainitsemisen arvoista? 
 
